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ABSTRACT

The Impact of Foreign Aid on Voting
Inside the United Nations
by
Daniel Shayne Morey
Dr. A. C. Tuttle, Examination Committee Chair
Associate Professor o f Political Science
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
The purpose o f this thesis is to determine if there is a cormection between United
States foreign aid donations and a recipient nation's voting patterns in the United Nations
General Assembly. Tests in the past have not employed thorough methodologies to deal
with the abundance o f variables that influence a nation's voting behavior. The
methodology created in this research focuses on three important conceptualizations.
First, this work creates a new definition of foreign aid; specifically, the inclusion of
military aid in a nation’s aid package as well as loans and grants, despite their different
characteristics. Second, this analysis considers only important votes to the donor nation,
not all votes in the General Assembly. This research also develops a new understanding
of abstentions, capturing the strategic nature o f this voting choice. Finally, this study
creates a classification scheme to break nations into homogenous groups.

m
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION
Does United States bilateral foreign aid win votes in the United Nations General
Assembly? This has been a question for students of international relations since the
establishment of the United Nations. However, to date there has been no satisfactory
answer to this question, mainly because the methods employed and the understanding of
United Nations policies have not been equal to the daunting task of interpreting the
actions of nations in the United Nations. This research introduces a new way o f
exploring this topic with the hope o f in fluencing future research and to provide an answer
to whether aid influences nations in the United Nations.
There are three reasons why political scientists should reexamine the question of
aid as a tool o f influence in the United Nations. First, the foreign aid program o f the
United States is under political attack fiom both ends o f the political spectrum.
Conservatives in this country do not want taxpayers burdened with providing foreign aid
because they feel it does not forward the national interest. Liberals view the aid budget
as a potential target for cuts to allow continued funding o f social policies under the tight
fiscal conditions o f the 1990s. However, recent presidential administrations have fought
drastic alterations to aid budgets, stating it is a necessary component of American
diplomatic and national security efforts. It is clear only one side can be right in these
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political arguments; it is the task of international researchers to determine which, if
possible. Exploring the connection between aid and voting is one step in this process.
Second, the United Nations is becoming a more popular topic in national politics
and among average citizens. While an anti-United Nations movement is not sweeping
the nation, discontent does appear to be rising. Many people view the United Nations as
an anti-American institution working against the interest of the United States. Studies
focusing on what truly takes place inside the United Nations will allow for rational debate
o f the issues, instead of the wild speculation currently circulates in this country.
Finally, the United Nations and the world have changed since the early 1990s.
The end o f the Cold War altered the structure o f global politics without alleviating the
problems facing nations. Even i f past studies were correct in their analysis o f the
influence o f aid, these conclusions are no longer reliable as evidence regarding the
influence o f aid today. It is time to reexamine this issue and test modem behavior in the
United Nations.
This study is essentially an extensive methodology for how to approach the study
o f aid and United Nations voting. It details the complexities of this research providing
the reader with a full understanding the issues. Moving beyond description, this research
offers prescriptions for dealing with these elements. Finally, this study offers some
conclusion from an analysis o f voting in the United Nations from 1995-1997.
Three topical areas divide this work. Chapters two and three provide relevant
background information on this research. Chapter two outlines various theoretical
approaches to studying aid to allow this worics placement among other research on this
topic. With specific attention paid to international relations theories o f aid, which guide

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

3
this research. Chapter three reviews pertinent past studies on this topic. The review
covers only the essential points, instead o f providing a full review o f each article.
Further, a brief description o f each work accompanies the discussion o f the strengths and
weaknesses o f the methods employed.
Chapters four, five, and six outline how to perform an accurate test o f aid and
voting. Chapter four describes the issues dealing with aid; specifically what to include in
a nations aid package and how to measure the strength o f aid (expected influence the
amount o f aid should have). Chapter five covers the multiple issues concerning votes in
the United Nations. With attention focused on the idea o f important versus unimportant
votes. Further, this chapter covers the multiple meanings o f abstentions. Finally, chapter
six categorizes nations for comparison by focusing only on essential variables o f national
voting behavior.
The conclusion comprises the final section of this work covering the results and
policy implications o f the study. Further, this section provides an outline for future
research on this topic.
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CHAPTER2

IN THEORY
Establishing a fînn theoretical base is necessary to understand the issues in this
research. As with all studies, this theoretical model will determine the questions asked as
well as the manner in which they are answer. This chapter will survey the four
theoretical camps dealing with foreign aid, with special attention given to the
international relations approach. Further, this chapter will show the progression from the
general question o f “Why nations give foreign aid?” to a specific question o f “Does aid
influence voting in the UN?” In the end, this chapter will construct a testable hypothesis
firmly grounded in international relations theory.
It is important to note that not all o f these theoretical camps derive fiom
international relations studies. Instead, they derive from multiple fields o f political
science as well as economics. Further, it is easy to envision the use o f research methods
from other academic fields, particularly psychology and sociology, in answering these
questions. Although, the primary focus o f this study is the impact o f aid upon the
relationship between nations, international relations, its base is not completely in this
field. While other fields will not play a primary role in exploring the relationship
between aid and voting, they do take on prominence in answering the larger question o f
“Why nations provide and accept foreign aid?” Evoi though this paper will focus only
on the question o f aids’ influence on UN voting, it can never truly escape the larger
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question in which it is embedded. Further, reviewing these other theoretical
understandings will allow for the correct placement o f this work among the multitudes of
research performed on foreign aid.
In reviewing these theoretical designs, this research will rely upon the typology
created by John White. ‘ This typology clearly divides the work on foreign aid into
meaningful sub-fields, which clarifies the discussion o f the topic. The four sub-fields
White creates are supplemental, displacement, recipient-oriented, and donor-oriented
theories.^ The first two sub-fields deal primarily with economic issues, the latter two
cover political issues.

Economic Theories
Supplemental theories, also called positive theories, deal with the role o f foreign
in the economic development o f recipient nations.^ These theories state that some
essential factor o f development is missing (savings, foreign exchange, or skilled labor)
and that foreign aid can replace, or supplement, these missing ingredients. By
supplementing these factors o f growth, foreign aid allows a nation to develop
economically.'* In the end, the recipient nation will reach a certain development level and
be able to sustain its growth without further aid.
Supplemental theories explain the purpose o f aid, but do not directly provide an
answer to why a nation would provide aid. Unfortunately, the cohesiveness o f this
theoretical group dissolves when answering this question. The answers vary fiom
fu lfillin g

the obligations o f developed nations towards underdeveloped nations to

developing markets for donor exports. With the exception of fulfilling the duty o f the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

6
developed to the less developed, all o f these answers to why a nation provides foreign aid
incorporate some form o f direct advantage for the donor. These answers all provide an
economic benefit to the donor and are not purely altruistic in nature.^
Displacement, or negative, theories comprise the second camp of economic
theories.^ This group follows the same basic ideas o f supplemental theories; aid replaces
a needed resource o f growth inside recipient nations. However, instead o f being helpful
to the recipient, the aid is harmfiil. Instead o f merely supplementing existing behavior,
the aid replaces the needed behavior, or displaces it, causing the needed markets never to
develop because the recipient nation sees no reason to invest in their development.^ If the
needed markets never develop, the recipient nation is forever dependent upon foreign aid.
This theory further states that this might be intentional to maintain the subservient
relationship between donor and recipient. Displacement theorists believe aid is a tool of
control and oppression designed not to encourage development but to stop or at least
hinder it. Whether accidental or designed, displacement theories argue that aid harms
development instead of fostering it as supplemental theorists maintain.^

Political Theories
Along with these competing economic theories, there exist two political science
theories. Although not contradictory to one another, the two theories promote different
ways of exploring foreign aid. The first theory focuses on how recipients use aid, the
second concentrates on the uses o f aid from the donor’s perspective.
Recipient based theories, which derive from comparative politics, focus on the
use o f aid by recipient nations. More importantly, since aid goes to governments instead
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o f people, it focuses on how governments use aid resources.^ Accordingly, aid is a
resource that individual governments use to support their reigns. In short, aid keeps
governments from making hard political choices, such as cutting government social
programs or raising taxes, which would be unpopular and lead to widespread discontent
with the regime. Thus, aid underwrites the policies o f a regime, enabling it to remain in
power.
Recipient based theories, like the supplemental economic theories, answers how
nations use aid, but does not inherently answer why a nation provides aid. To answer this
question requires a retum to the donor’s goals, not the recipients. These theorist believe
that donors desire global stability that results from maintaining ruling regimes, especially
regimes fostering favorable foreign policies. Again, as with the economic theories, aid is
far from altruistic.
Donor-based theories occupy the rest o f this chapter and serve as the theoretical
base o f this study. Employing donor-based theories supplies a clear answer to why a
nation would provide aid. Unlike the other theoretical camps that discuss how nations
can use aid and then speculate to why a nation would provide it, donor-based theories
concentrate solely on why a nation provides foreign aid. Instead of looking at the
economic issues involved or internal uses of aid, donor based theories take an
intemational relations approach to examining aid. This theoretical model explores the
changing relationship between nations when one provides aid to another. Inherent in the

donor-based theories is the assumption that donor nations attempt to gain political
advantage from recipient nations.
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The nature o f the relationship between donor and recipient nation may vary. One
version of this relationship has recipients becoming dependent upon aid and unable to
survive without it. In order to ensure aids continued inflow, the recipient nation agrees to
demands made by the donor nation, whether explicit or implicit. A second version has a
voluntary basis in which recipients agree in advance to perform certain functions, or
allow certain actions, in exchange for aid. Regardless of the exact mechanics of the
relationship, the provision o f aid is to win support from other nations. (See diagram 2-1)
It is this belief that donor nations seek to influence recipient nations through foreign aid,
and donor-based theories, that this research will test empirically.

Influence

Q

Recipient

Donor

Aid

Diagram 2-1

Hans Morgenthau provides the best elaboration of donor theories. Morgenthau
developed a theory o f foreign aid that outlined the basic goal o f aid and attempted to
show where aid policy has gotten away from its original purpose.

True to his realist

roots^\ Morgenthau states that aid is a tool o f foreign policy with its sole purpose being
to gain influence. According to Morgaithau, there are six types o f aid: humanitarian,
subsistence, economic, military, prestige, and bribery, hi order to understand
Morgenthau’s point a brief review o f these aid types is required.
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The first type o f aid, humanitarian, is the only type o f aid that is not inherently
political. As Morgenthau defines it, humanitarian aid is aid that governments extend to
other governments which are

. .victims o f natural disasters”.'^ If aid were attributable

to certain governments then it would serve a political purpose by establishing a positive
mindset inside o f recipient governments and, less importantly, in the people.'^ To
perceive a recipient nation as generous and benevolent establishes a favorable political
connection between two nations and a favorable view o f the donors system of
government. Thus, even humanitarian aid develops influence for a donor nation, if
conducted properly.
Subsistence aid is money provided to nations unable to "... maintain minimal
public services".

In other words, subsistence aid eliminates budget deficits in nations

not commanding enough resources to provide needed services to their citizens. The
political impacts of this form of aid are clear. First, it defends the status quo maintaining
governments that would likely fall in the absence o f aid. Second, any government
receiving subsistence aid will be unlikely to risk losing it for fear of falling firom power.
For if governments are unable to maintain “minimal public services” the citizens of the
country will replace them. This fear offers a clear avenue o f influence for donor nations.
Aid for economic development is the next type. This is aid designated to help
build the economic infirastmcture of a nation in hope o f aiding the overall development of
the nation. However, Morgenthau attacks this version o f aid as unwise and unworkable.
First, he attacks the idea that a deficiency causes slow development and the belief that
foreign aid can overcome the problem. Morgenthau correctly states that in certain
circumstances slow development is not caused by one deficiency, but rather development
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is not possible for certain countries. Expending money on projects and training can not
overcome the fact that some nations lack any ability to develop beyond a certain point.
However, Morgenthau is most persuasive when he identifies political factors
influencing developmental aid. In short, development is a destabilizing event that can,
and likely will, lead to greater harm for American interests in the end. By altering the
economic structure o f any nation, the United States risks bringing to power a collection
of individuals that may not be fiiendly in action or philosophy. Further instability
accompanies the transformation between primitive and advanced economies; the turmoil
in Russia is evidence o f this fact. It is impossible to predict the conclusion o f these
upheavals and can lead to damage even if in the end a friendly govermnent is
established.
Military aid, which dominated American foreign aid until the 1960’s, is the third
form of aid. However, Morgenthau states that military aid does not play a military role as
much as a political one. He declares that donors “ ... seeks political advantage in
exchange for military aid. It obligates by implication the recipient toward the giver”.
Military aid operates as a bribe, obligating recipients to forgo actions that would cause
the donor to revoke assistance.
The purpose o f prestige aid is to outfit an underdeveloped nation with external
appearances o f modernity. In this function, aid funds vast projects that give appearances
o f technological and economic advancement These projects take on a variety o f forms
firom airports to roads - which do not need to serve a real function, especially
economically. Donors and recipients do not openly recognize prestige aid; instead, they
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hide projects under the categories o f military or economic aid. Prestige aid operates, like
military aid, as a bribe, according to Morgenthau.*’
Bribes comprise the final form o f aid, and its one true purpose according to
Morgenthau. Bribes are transfers o f money and/or services finm one government to
another as the " ... price paid for political services rendered or to be rendered”.^** These
services take on a variety of forms meant to provide the donor with some advantage, as
identified in the following paragraphs. Bribery is the true purpose o f all types o f aid,
with the possible exception o f humanitarian aid. Further, this has been the purpose of aid
throughout history. Morgenthau’s theory o f aid as a bribe puts the question at hand into
clear relief. By replacing the word aid with bribe in diagram one, the basic principle of
donor-based theories is clear. (See diagram 2-2)

Influence

|Q

Recipient

Donor

Bribe

Diagram 2-2

The problem with connecting aid as bribery comes firom the fact that modem
nations, especially the United States, have sought to hide the true nature o f the
relationship. They have developed complex cover stories, such as aid for development,
and established government agaicies to achieve these mythical goals. In the end, the
cover story o f aid for development has become mistaken for reality and both recipient
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and donor nations are unhappy with the relationship. The recipient is unhappy over
excess strings attached to aid and donors feel betrayed by the recipient for not following
their end o f the bargain, supporting the donor. Thus, disguising the connection o f aid as a
bribe confuses participants, each expecting something different from the relationship."'
The recipient expects altruistic aid while the donor expects to gain influence over the
recipient.
In summary, donor theories state that aid is a tool to influence recipient nations, or
as Morgenthau states, it is a bribe presented in exchange for specific actions. As
straightforward as this theory is there exist methodological problems with its application.
The main obstacle attempting to measure the concept o f influence.

Applying Donor Theories
No comparisons o f aid and influence can be performed without first defining
when or how to measure influence. There are varied options open for research. One
could look at government statements from recipient nations, or troop commitments to
actions led by the donor nations. Alternatively, research may find influence in the text of
bilateral treaties. However, all of these options pose very serious problems for
researchers. Wars take place too infrequently to provide comparative value. The only
major US engagements in the past 50 years have been Korea, Vietnam, and the Gulf War.
This limited number does not provide enough data points to conduct a strong aggregated
study. Further, the octreme differences between engagements, both in time and in
substance, makes comparisons among them difficult, i f not impossible. Official
statements o f governments can often be misleading or contradictory. Politicians can
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design statements to meet multiple goals ranging from assuring an ally to winning
domestic political support. Determining the true audience for a statement could also
prove to be very difficult. Further, there is the question of whose statements to use. Are
all statements a government makes, especially a coalition government with its multiple
members, taken at equal value? These problems combine to make statement analysis
studies very impractical. Finally, treaties happen irregularly and contain a combination
of intemational forces and domestic politics. Further, after reviewing a variety of
treaties, it is clear there are few similarities to test.^ There is such a variety of subject
matter for treaties with no topic uniformly applicable to all nations. Further, the number
of multilateral treaties complicates this type o f study. By increasing the number o f
signatories to a treaty, it becomes difficult to assess who has influenced whom in the
negotiations.
With none o f these research methods being adequate, researchers have
concentrated on voting in the United Nations to gauge influence. The basic premise is
simple. Donor nations use aid to buy or win votes from recipient nations within the
United Nations (Diagram 2-3). If aid leads to influence, recipient nations should vote in
agreement with donor nations, usually defined as an identical vote to the donor.
According to this model, voting in the United Nations should be a function o f the amount
of aid received. (See formula 2-1)
The practice o f using voting in the United Nations, as a gauge o f influence, has
become widespread but is not uniformly accepted. Some authors believe that United
Nations votes have declined in importance over the years and donor nations no longer
seek to influence the outcome o f these votes.^ However, evidence seems to be to the
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contrary, especially for the United States. In recent years the United States has come to
place a high value on UN support. Evidence of this can be seen from US efforts to
ensure UN support o f the G ulf War, as well as US concern over the new Secretary
General. It would seem irrational for the US to exert these efforts if they viewed the UN,
and votes o f the General Assembly, as irrelevant.

Votes

Recipient

Donor

Bribe

Diagram 2-3

Formula 2-1
Support = Votes = / (aid)
This chapter reviewed the four contending theories dealing with foreign aid,
allowing for a better understanding of the issues involved with this research. Further, the
donor-based perspective on aid, when elaborated in detail provides a firm understanding
o f how to study foreign aid, as a bribe for specific actions. Finally, and most importantly,
the general question o f why a nation provides foreign aid has been transformed through
several steps into a testable question, “Does aid influence voting in the UN?” Before
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proceeding with the layout o f this study it is necessary to review other research on aid
and UN voting, reexamining the results these studies have found and the methods
employed.
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CHAPTERS

IN PRACTICE
Flowing from the theoretical work of chapter two, many scholars have attempted
to determine the correlation between aid and voting patterns. These studies are the
primary focus here in the third chapter. A review o f the methods and results o f these
diverse studies will demonstrate the need for a new approach, especially in the new post
Cold War environment
As with all research the first question that must be asked is how best to approach
the question. When exploring whether aid alters voting two different types o f studies are
typical. The first type, the case study, follows a particular issue over time and measuring
the influence o f aid against voting on that single issue, or set o f related issues. The
second approach involves aggregate studies covering several years and votes on
numerous issues. Most o f the studies of aid and voting have been the second type; in
fact, there has been only one well-circulated case study on this subject. Because it was
the first study performed and because of its conceptual significance, considerable
attention is devoted to the case study before turning to the aggregate studies.

Case Study
The only published example of a voting and foreign aid case study is Bernstein
and Alpert’s 1971 article “Foreign Aid and Voting Behavior in the United Nations: The

18
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Admission o f Communist China”. This study sought to measure the connection between
foreign aid and voting in the UN by looking at one single issue, which nation would
receive the credentials as the representative o f China.* With multiple votes on this issue
spanning a number o f years, this case provides a chance to study the impact of changes in

aid on the same topic. This assumes that the position o f a nation on the topic remains
constant over time, which they do not. However, within the confines o f the Cold War it
is a safe assumption that very few nations would have a spontaneous change o f heart
regarding the admission o f a communist nation thus minimizing the impact o f outside
factors.
Bernstein and Alpert start with a very simple set o f assumptions. First, both the
United States and the Soviet Union would seek to build the necessary coalition to win the
vote and then would seek to conserve resources by not expending any more than
absolutely necessary.^ Second, nations do not make all important decisions on the floor,
but behind the scenes permitting a certain degree o f bargaining. Finally, neither of the
Cold War camps would suffer any defections during voting. Instead, to gain the number
o f votes needed to win, both camps would have to obtain the support o f non-aligned
nations, particularly those in the Third World.^
Based on these assiunptions, they hypothesized that a nation has three choices
depending on who is providing aid. I f the nation is receiving aid from both camps then
they should abstain. I f the nation is receiving aid from only one o f the two donors, the
United States or the Soviet Union, then they should vote with the donor. Finally, a nation
receiving no aid should abstain. According to Bernstein and AJperf s theory no recipient
would vote directly against a donor, which did occur.
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When they conducted their test, they found that nations did not behave completely
as predicted. First, nations receiving aid from both camps overwhelmingly voted yes (for
PRC admission) when they should have abstained. Further, when nations received no aid
the plmality voted no (46 percent).'* However, when a nation received aid from only one
camp they voted as predicted 90 percent o f the time. Despite the anomalies, Bernstein
and Alpert concluded that foreign aid and voting are connected and that aid is an
effective instrument o f foreign policy.
While instructive, the Bernstein and Alpert piece suffers from multiple
deficiencies. The first and most obvious is that it is hard to generalize finm a case study.
Since the votes dealt with only one topic, it is hard to determine if the subject matter or
foreign aid was the crucial factor.
Further, Bernstein and Alpert assume that an abstention is a neutral vote that
would not harm either camp. Thus, a nation receiving aid firom both should abstain.
However, in this case, since the Soviet Union needed a supermajority according to United
Nations rules, an abstention by a nation receiving aid from them meant the Soviet Union
had wasted resources, while the United States in effect gained a vote.
Along this same line, the authors did not attempt to correlate levels of aid and
voting. Instead aid is a binary variable, simply on or off. It is irrational to believe that a
nation would run the risk o f losing a large amount of aid simply to protect a smaller
amount. It makes sense to assume that when a nation received aid from both camps the
relative amount o f aid determined its vote. A nation would only abstain if the amounts
were equal. Consideration o f relative levels o f aid should improve the predictions for
nations receiving aid fixrm both camps.
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Bernstein and Alpert also do not account for the strategic nature o f nations. They
predict that nations receiving no aid should abstain from voting because they do not have
a stake in the matter. However, since abstention maintained the status quo, forcing
further votes, the nations not receiving aid increased their chances of receiving aid in the
future giving them a stake in the outcome. Strategically minded nations have a built-in
preference for forcing future votes, a preference that Bernstein and Alpert neglected and
the Soviets had to overcome.
Finally, Bernstein and Alpert assume that each camp was only attempting to
achieve one goal. In their design, nations provided aid to ensure the proper vote on one
issue. However, the two camps could have been providing aid for votes on other issues.
This is a special concern in the case o f the United States, which needed only a few votes
to block the entry of the PRC. Following this logic, the United States might have
provided aid to nations that voted yes to ensure their votes on other issues because they
were already sure o f victory on the China issue. Thus, the United States could have been
working toward multiple goals that might have clouded the results of this study. Only by
looking at voting tendencies as a whole, which was outside the scope o f this case study,
could control for this contingency.
Although this case study did not conclusively answer the question at hand, it did
establish the link between aid and UN voting and it further provided the starting point for
future research. Building on this work, other scholars have attempted to correct some of
its basic problems to strengthen the case for or against foreign aid. However, solutions
vary widely. The only true commonality is that they are all aggregate studies o f voting
and aid.
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Aggregate Studies
When performing an aggregated study a researcher must address certain issues.
The approach to these issues largely determines the conclusions each study reaches. By
looking at each issue and the authors method for dealing with it the complexity of each
study becomes clear. This level o f complexity is what distinguishes these works.

Nations
The first issue of concem is how to treat the nations under study. The first and
most obvious division is between donor and recipient. However, among the recipient
nations there exists a wide degree o f diversity to account for in any study o f this nature.
In a survey o f factors affecting UN voting, Kul B. Rai illustrated the impact o f these
kinds o f differences. Relevant differences involve military alliances, ideological
orientation o f the government, the electoral system, level o f economic development,
geographic location, and colonial status.^ Rai speculates that all o f these variables affect
how a nation is disposed to vote on an issue before the General Assembly. Even though
not all o f the variables tested turned out to be significant several did including geography,
former colonial status, military alliances, and economic circumstances.*^ Clearly some
attempt to divide nations into more homogeneous groupings is required to study the
impact o f aid and voting accinrately.^
It should not be smprising that not all research has ctq>italized on these findings,
or at least has not taken full advantage o f them. First, Wittkopfs 1973 study preceded
Rai’s woric. However, later works have not heeded Rai’s results nearly enough.
Ironically, not even Rai integrated his original findings fully in his follow-up study on
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voting and aid performed in 1980. Here Rai only divided nations along geographic lines.
While this study did find a stronger correlation between aid and voting when factoring in
geogr^hy, it still might have underestimated this impact because o f the exclusion o f
other variables.
The most extensive attempt to control for outside factors comes from Sexton and
Decker. They divided nations by type o f government and level of economic
development However, Sexton and Decker only had two categories for nations in each
division. In their design, nations were either democratic or totalitarian and developed or
less developed economically.* This provided for only four total types o f nations:
democratic developed, democratic undeveloped, totalitarian developed, and totalitarian
undeveloped. This scheme does not come close to capturing the essence o f the
differences among nations. This effort is clearly the most complex attempt to classify
nations but it is far from adequate. In order to frilly divide nations into meaningful
homogeneous groups research must look at more issues then government type and
economic development Further, by having only two types o f governments and levels of
development is overly simplistic and does not provide an adequate classification scheme.
Another question concerning nations is which or how many to include in the
study. This may seem like a very non-conflictual question; however, it defies an easy
answer, hi fact, existing studies have used different groups of nations in their tests. In
their study, Sexton and Decker generally used all nations in the United Nations, though
they excluded Israel finm some analyses arguing that it was skewing the results. It is
interesting to note that they do not make any direct comparison between the nations
receiving aid and those that are not^ This seems to be a rather important omission when
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attempting to answer the question of aid’s impact on voting. Without making a
comparison between the group receiving aid and the group not receiving aid, it is difficult
to observe the true influence o f aid. Nations not receiving aid provide comparison for
recipient behavior.
Two other studies*® use very select samples for their test. First, Wittkopf uses
only nations receiving ‘positive aid’, (i.e., those actually receiving aid) fi-om one of
sixteen potential donors during the years o f his study. He finther restricts his sample by
requiring that recipient nations were present for at least 60 percent of the votes for the
General Assembly sessions in question.* * Nonetheless, 96 o f 115 potential nations make
it into the sample, a high percentage.'^
Rai includes only nations classified as less developed that were receiving aid.
This is by far the most restrictive sample employed. Under this method the number of
nations studied shrinks to as low as 66 in some years. *^ This may not seem like a huge
decrease from WittkopFs 96; however, the UN had grown between the two studies.
The biggest problem with Rai’s sample is that by excluding nations not classified
as “less developed” (an exact definition o f this term is not given) the sample may have
been biased towards weak results. In particular in 1972 Rai had found that economic
development was an important factor in the voting behavior o f nations. By intentionally
excluding better developed nations receiving aid Rai may have weakened his results.
Given his earlier evidence it does not seem wise to limit the sample in such a manner
when looking for a general trend among nations.
The final question concerning nations in these studies is how many donor nations
to study simultaneously. In most studies, multiple donors are used.*'* hi both o f Rai’s
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studies he explores Soviet and American aid together and compares the results each
nation has achieved. His findings, which show Soviet economic aid more effective at the
same time U.S. military aid was more effective, are interesting but do not necessarily
answer the question at hand. Wittkopf also compares many donor nations. He finds that
they all achieve about the same level o f success with their aid programs. Finally, Sexton
and Decker use only the United States for their design.
Based on W ittkopfs finding that all nations have about the same success rate, and
the fact that as the number o f donor nations grows the amount of data needed becomes
very unmanageable, it seems sensible to test only one donor nation at a time. Further, the
fact that the United States provides aid to more nations than any other country, especially
with the demise o f the Soviet Union, warrants Sexton and Decker’s concentration on the
United States.

Aid
The second set o f issues facing researchers concerns the conceptualization of aid.
Although this may seem minor, it does take on a high level of importance. When looking
at this type of study altering what is included in the calculation o f aid has a deep impact.
Further, the inclusion or exclusion o f certain types o f aid allows for the manipulation of
outcomes.
hi this research, there are two basic types of aid: economic and military. The
purpose of economic aid is to stimulate economic growth while military aid is to secure
alliances and promote the defense o f the recipient nations. In his fibrst study, Rai found
that both types o f aid have an impact; however, the impact varies according to the nation
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studied.*^ Further, he found that military aid was more effective for the United States
than economic aid.
Most research, however, has focused on economic aid. In fact, only Sexton and
Decker use a model that includes anything other than economic aid. Focusing on only
one form of aid leads to an under-evaluation o f the amount o f aid a nation receives
because military aid comprises a large portion o f many nations’ aid packages. The most
extreme case o f this is Israel, which receives armually over one billion dollars in military
aid.*® Leaving this out o f the calculation seems not only unwarranted but to cause a
definite skew in the data presented.
Another issue involves how to calculate the importance o f aid to the nation
receiving it. Currently, there are three different ways to conceptualize what I will refer to
as ‘strength o f aid’: total aid in raw amounts (however defined), aid per capita of the
recipient nation, and aid as a percentage o f the recipient’s GDP.*^
Wittkopf used only total aid amounts (over a three year time span) to test for
correlations. Sexton and Decker tested both total amounts and per capita aid in their
study. Rai employed all three measures o f the strength of aid. Rai and Wittkopf found
that aggregate aid did not have an impact; however, Rai did find that per c ^ ita bad a
strong effect. In contrast, Sexton and Decker found no coimections using any strength of
aid measures.
Another issue concerning aid is the conceptualization o f the role it plays. Rai has
symbolized the importance o f aid in two different ways. First, Rai thinks donors use aid
to induce certain behaviors fiom recipient nations. Second, aid can function as a
punishment for nations past actions. Sexton and Decker along with W ittkopf both
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assume that aid induces future behavior, not punish past actions. W ittkopf explicitly tests
the punishment hypothesis finding that it is not accurate for U.S. aid, which is what Rai
also found. However, the conceptualization o f aid is very important for it determines the
direction o f the correlation performed. If aid wins votes, then increased aid should win
more votes thus, a forward (linearly speaking) connection. However, if aid punishes for
voting behavior in the past then the correlation is a backward one. Put another way if aid
wins support an increase in aid one year then should lead to favorable votes increasing in
the next year. Conversely if aid rewards or punishes past behavior then favorable votes
increasing in year one should lead us to expect aid to increase in year two. Thus, how aid
is conceptualizes determines the direction of the correlation that we expect to find.

Votes
The final issue facing researchers is how to define votes in the United Nations.
There are four choices open to every nation (yes, no, abstain, absent); studies of this type
would be much easier if only the first two were options. The meaning o f the latter two
choices is not always easy to identify. Further, not all votes have the same degree of
importance to all nations. Certain subjects affect a nation directly while others are
relatively unimportant. By this logic, nations, especially donor nations, would seek to
influence only those votes that are important to them. Surprisingly, there has been a great
deal o f consensus among researchers on these two questions.
First, following W ittkopfs lead, no study has attempted to explore the
relationship between important votes to donors and aid. W ittkopf focused attention
... on the relationship between aid and voting preference o f developing
states identifiable on the basis of all o f these votes: no attempt will be
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made to identify “critical” votes or specific issues o f particular
significance to either aid donors or recipients.**
In order to prove a general trend Wittkopf felt that all votes should be included, not just
important ones. Unfortunately, he does not provide a logical reason for this abstention.
He does mention that other research has attempted to discover the connection between
aid and important issues but dismisses them because “Generally speaking” the results
have not suggested a connection.*’
Wittkopf cites a study he performed with James Green on voting behavior and the
Chinese admission question as proof o f his point.^® Nevertheless, he ignores other
studies such as the Bernstein and Albert piece. At best, it is safe to say that the question
o f important votes versus general votes is still open; however, Wittkopf assumed it was
closed without providing reasonable evidence why, establishing the practice of ignoring
the differences between critical and general votes.^*
When exploring abstentions there has again been remaricable similarity between
the studies. Only Rai's 1980 work has deviated from the norm. Sexton and Decker as
well as Wittkopf do not attempt to explore the meaning o f abstention. This is not
surprising because both studies theorize that aid recipients should vote exactly as the
donor did. Thus, abstention should only happen when the donor abstains. Using this
methodology there are no alternatives for how to view abstentions. Although this is
certainly easier when dealing with such a wide array o f data, it may not be entirely
accurate. As Rai highlights there are multiple meanings to non-votes.^ He states that
nations may be absent (non-vote) because they object to the vote and refuse to take part.^
In this case, the non-vote is indeed a very strong vote no. Other meanings are also
possible. Rai does not attempt to sort out these problems. Instead, he limits his study to
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counting an absence as an abstention, except when a nation is absent to protest a vote.
This is an improvement but still missing some important points. For example, is an
abstention to avoid voting against a donor nation to be considered support?
Consideration o f these types o f questions has yet to take place.

Results
It is not surprising that with so many unresolved methodological issues there has
been little agreement about whether aid affects voting in the UN. The three full studies
focused on here cover the spectrum of possible outcomes. Sexton and Decker find no
connection between the two variables, though when Israel is removed firom the model the
coefficients become negative.^^ Wittkopf finds strong support for a negative relationship,
arguing that aid “rewards our enemies”.^ However, he ultimately believes even this
relationship to be spurious. Rai finds that, using per c ^ ita measures, there is a positive
relationship between aid and votes.^® With these various results, it is little wonder that
there is no general agreement in the field about the connection between aid and voting
and that the question is still actively debated. The last section discusses how to improve
research on the connection between aid and voting.

Conclusion; Towards a New Research Agenda
As if the research issues discussed above are not serious enough, this research
also suffers firom the passage o f time. The world has changed greatly since even the most
recent study in 1992. The end o f the Cold War and the realignment o f nations have made
this research even more complicated. Research can not perform case studies between two
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large blocks as Bernstein and Alpert did. Further, research must reexamine many o f the
past accepted assumptions.
First, Rai’s 1972 study on what impacts voting patterns in the UN needs updating
for the UN o f the 1990s. In order to divide nations accurately into more homogeneous
blocks to test the impact o f aid, research must identify the important characteristics of
nations. Then a classification scheme for nations must accurately control for outside
variables that have tainted past studies. Rai’s original work, along with Sexton and
Decker's simple classification scheme, demonstrates clearly the need to stop treating all
nations as equal. Performing aggregate studies comparing nations without controlling for
differences will be to compare apples to oranges. To accurately assess the effects of
foreign aid on voting behavior there must be a test performed on nations that are as
similar as possible. Even though it is not possible to account for every trait or variable,
there must be a more sophisticated model than employed in the past.
Further, an updated research design should include all members o f the United
Nations. Looking at only nations receiving aid ignores half o f the question. If there is no
comparison between aid recipients and non-recipients part of the impact o f aid upon
nations is om it Designing this control group, into the categorization o f nations, will
provide researchers will a great deal more data on the question. If it is possible to show
that similar nations receiving aid vote at a higher rate with the donor nations than those
not receiving aid, this would provide evidence for the influential powers o f foreign aid.
Just as researchers must rethink their treatment o f nations, they must also alter
their understanding o f aid. First, economic aid must lose it place o f primacy. Future
studies should not ignore the role military aid plays. Combining military and economic
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aid will reflect the full amount of support a nation receives from aid. By excluding
military aid past research has undervalued the influence donor nations have over
recipients. Considering the amount o f aid that is classified as military they may have
done so in a drastic way. Research should continue to determine if there is a substantial
difference between economic and military aid. However, until there is a satisfactory
answer there should be no amount of aid mccluded.
Finally, research needs to explore the various complexities o f votes in the United
Nations. Treating all votes as equal suffers firom the same type o f conceptual problems as
treating all nations identically. The first issue to address is important vs. general votes.
There may be no difference between the two types o f votes but this should be resolved
empirically. Second, researchers must develop a more sophisticated scheme for looking
at abstentions and absences, one that accounts for strategic voting. The goal o f a donor
nation is not necessarily to achieve identical votes firom all o f its recipient nations.
Instead, as the Bernstein and Alpert article shows, the goal o f a nation is to win the
overall vote on a resolution. By this logic, an abstention or an absence may be helpful to
a donor nation, in determining the final outcome of the vote.

Successfully addressing these issues will move us closer to a definitive answer to
the question o f whether aid impacts voting in the United Nations. Although the research
agenda above does not solve every problem, it moves in the right direction. Rewriting
the formula o f influence to incorporate these ideas creates Formula 3-1.

Formula 3-1
Support = / (aid, vote, nation)
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CHAPTER4

DEFINITIONS AND CONCEPTS OF AID
In order to improve testing between foreign aid and United Nations voting there is
a need to alter traditional understandings of the term “aid”. Research must reexamine
and alter traditional beliefo and definitions in order to align this research with factual and
logical evidence as well as the new global environment. There are three main issues to
resolve: first, what categories o f aid to use in calculating a nations total aid package,
second, the differences between loans and grants, and finally, how to determine the
strength of aid. This chapter will review these issues and define how this study will
resolve them.

Mihtary vs. Economic Aid
The first concept to clarify is the need to incorporate military aid into the
calculations o f a nation’s aid package. As noted in chapter three, most studies have only
used economic aid to determine the amount of aid a nation receives. While this is
expedient, it does not adequately capture the impact aid has on recipient nations. By
underestimating the amount o f aid received, past studies have not measured foreign aid
against UN voting ; instead they have measured economic aid and determined that it does
not have a significant impact on voting. Supporting the claim to include military aid are

34
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logical and factual reasons, along with empirical evidence. This section will explore
these issues and demonstrate the need to include military aid.
Research must not ignore four essential observations when considering military
aid. These observations do not provide all o f the evidence for the inclusion o f aid;
however, they provide the base for the overall argument.
The first observation is that historically, military aid has been the largest portion
o f American foreign aid.* This is no surprise since most of American aid history has
taken place under the shadow o f the Cold War. However, in recent years economic aid
has surpassed military aid although the latter remains a large and significant percentage
o f total aid. In 1995, military aid comprised ^jproximately twenty-five percent o f the
total aid budget.^ This is one o f the lowest points, in percentage, for military aid. In
1995, emphasis shifted to providing transition assistance to many former communist
nations, which drastically increased economic loans and grants while military aid
remained unchanged. By 1997, military aid comprised approximately thirty-eight percent
o f the aid budget, restoring the balance.^ It is important to note that the 1997 numbers are
more representative o f aid in recent times. The approximate split between economic and
military aid is consistently sixty/forty.
Thus, not incorporating military aid amounts excludes approximately forty
percent of American assistance. Even using the lower percentage o f 1995 as a base line
would exclude one-fourth o f all aid. In order to test the full impact o f aid on UN voting
all aid must be included. Otherwise, only the impact o f the counted portions o f aid is
analyzed not the effect o f aid as a whole.
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A second fact to take into account is which nations receive military aid. It is clear
from reviewing military aid contributions that nations receiving military aid tend to be
strong US allies. The United States does not provide military aid to all nations; instead,
nations that are o f strategic interest, and nations that have strong ties with the US, receive
military aid. The best example o f this is Israel, which receives 1.8 billion dollars in
military aid, the largest amount to any single nation.* Examples o f other nations receiving
significant amounts o f aid (one million dollars or more) also demonstrate the fact that the
United States provides aid to military and political important nations, such as Poland,
Thailand, and Turkey. Even though not every nation fits this pattern, the overall trend
does favor strong US allies receiving military aid. Excluding military aid weakens the
correlation between aid and UN voting, especially for nations receiving the majority of
their money in the form o f military aid. Comparatively speaking, excluding military aid
lowers the amount o f aid that strong supporters receive at the same time raising the
amount less supportive nations receive. This leads to weaker, less reliable results than
are achievable.
The third fact is that certain nations receive only military aid. Examples of this
class of nations in 1997 included Estonia, Comoros, Bahrain, and Argentina.® Although
the total amounts of aid are limited, usually under one million dollars, by only counting
economic aid these nations ^jpear to receive no aid, which is very different than
receiving a small amount o f aid. This wül be even more important when designing a new
strength o f aid indicator. Here it is sufficient to state by not counting military aid a
sizable portion o f nations are not counted as receiving any aid, which will skew any
attempt at correlating aid and voting.
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Finally, past studies have linked military aid and recipient behavior. First, Rai
found economic and military aid both had some connection to voting support, Rai also
found that different forms o f aid had different success rates based on the donor nations
studied.® By choosing between categories o f aid, the researcher can manipulate results of
these types of studies. Further, Morgenthau clearly links military aid and support, stating
that nations understood the true nature o f military aid (as a bribe) more than with
economic aid.^ In order to test Morgenthau’s theory, military aid must be included.
Now that the logical and factual arguments for including military aid are clear, it
is time to look at the actual impact of including military aid. The use of a ten-nation
sample will illustrate the impact of the issues mentioned. This sample is not
representative of the total population but includes nations from all geographic regions.
Table 4-1 provides both the military and economic aid amounts for the sample.
Table 4-1 sorts the nations by amount o f economic aid received. It is clear from
comparing the economic and military aid columns that the ranking criteria (economic or
military aid) drastically alters the ordering. Only three nations remain in the same
position, Israel, El Salvador, and Albania, all o f the others shift some dramatically. What
this illustrates is if it is expect that nations receiving more aid support the United States
more often, then how they are ranked will determine largely whether this expectation will
be achieved.
To illustrate the importance o f mihtary aid to nations receiving it Table 4-1 also
presents mihtary aid as a percent of total aid. This best illustrates the importance of
mihtary aid, which has a different impact on almost ever nation, percentages range from
100 to 0. What is important to note is the nations that are in the middle. Sixty percent o f
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Israel's aid would not be included in its total aid package without military aid. Thailand
and Argentina are also «ccellent cases for including military aid; each o f these nations
would have sixteen percent o f their aid unincorporated without military aid. In other
years, utilizing only economic aid would result in counting certain nations as receiving no
aid when in fact they received large amounts o f military aid.*

Table 4- 1
Ten Nation Sample - Aid Distribution
Percent Militf
Total Aid
Name
Military Aid Economic Aid
3,000
60.0%
1,800
Israel
1,200
119.8
0.2%
Ethiopia
.2
119.6
.4
63.6
0.6%
El Salvador
63.2
31.4
.2
0.6%
Albania
31.2
21.8
0.9%
Zimbabwe
.2
21.6
13.5
0.7%
.1
13.4
Swaziland
11.2
0.9%
.1
Belarus
11.1
8.1
8.1
0.0%
0
Yemen
16.4%
5.1
6.1
1
Thailand
16.7%
.6
Argentina
.1
.5
Data from U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants 1995 - in millions.

It is important to note that when sorting the nations according to economic aid and
total aid, the orderings are identical. This is not an indictment against military aid.
Instead, it is a function o f the sample chosen to illustrate these points. Further, even if
economic and total aid rankings were the same for all nations, it would not justify the
exclusion o f military aid. Including only economic aid misrepresents the total aid
package of nations exclusively receiving military aid.
This section outlined the reasons, both logical and empirical, for the inclusion o f
military aid in any correlation study between aid and voting in the UN. The purpose o f
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this section was to illustrate the significance o f excluding military aid out on these
studies. After observing the difTerence made by disregarding m ilitary aid, it becomes
clear that it m ust be included in any true test o f aid and voting in the UN.

Grants and Loans
Past studies have not inquired into the different effects o f grants and loans. Since
each has different characteristics, each should have a different impact upon recipients;
however, there has been no attempt to analyze this issue.
The basic difference between loans and grants determines the influence o f each.
Despite possessing low interest rates, loans are not gifts and the recipient must repay
them. Unlike loans, donors provide grants to recipients without expectations o f
repayment. It is logical that a nation would be more likely to support a donor nation
when they do not have to return the money. W hile not always the case, sometimes loans
are a direct tool o f bribery. This is not to say that loans, especially very low interest
loans, do not affect recipient behavior; instead, it is likely that loans have a sm all impact.
Because loans are contractual obligations extending over several years the donor nation
can not withhold funds, or alter the agreement to the recipient’s detriment, for
unsupportive nations. However, donor nations can withhold grants for any reason
because they appropriate them on a yearly basis. Reinforcing this is the fact that there are
many m ultinational organizations that provide loans to nations, thus eliminating reliance
on one source. I f a nation did not have other borrowing opportunities the effect on their
behavior would m ost likely be greater.
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This study will not differentiate between loans and grants for two reasons. First,
loans do have some impact on recipient behavior as discussed above. Second, and most
important, America provides very little aid in the form o f loans. In fact, 4.9 percent o f all
aid in 1995 was in the form o f loans while 95 percent was grants.’ These numbers are
representative o f aid disbursements in the 1990s with some variances: aid composition
has gone as high as 10 percent loan with 90 percent grant. Currently few nations receive
aid in the form o f loans; America provides the majority of its foreign aid as grants to
nations. Even Israel, the United States greatest aid recipient, receives all o f its funds in
grants. In the sample o f nations from above (Table 4-1), only Belarus receives any o f its
funds as loans (76%). In Belarus aid may exercise less influence; however, there are few
cases where the majority o f aid is loans making a test o f this proposition impossible. For
this study, no differentiation between loans and grants will take place. Differentiating
between loans and grants would not make a vast difference in the overall amount o f aid
provided. Further, as stated in the first section, research on this topic should incorporated
all aid if possible.

Strength o f Aid
The final issue concerning aid is how to measure the expected impact o f aid. Put
another way, what measure best determines the effect o f aid for comparison between
nations. Exploring the different methods for measuring the strength o f aid, which is a
calculation to determine the degree o f influence aid should have on a nation for
comparative purposes, w ill answer this questioiL
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Rai suggested that simple dollar amounts are not effective in testing the influence
o f aid upon voting. Rai felt that other measures, which control for certain national
characteristics, would provide a more accurate measurement tool. He tests aid as a part
o f gross domestic product (GDP) and aid per capita. However, each o f these methods has
serious limitations that restrict their effectiveness.
Aid per capita is a potential measure because as John White claims nations
receive a base amount o f support, that is different for each nation, plus an additional
preset amount per p e r s o n . I f White is correct, then utilizing population would help to
offset the effects o f the extra aid amounts provided per person, allowing us to compare
the base amounts more closely.
However, there are two main reasons not to use aid per capita as a strength of aid
indicator. First, donors do not directly provide aid to people; instead, it goes to
governments. ' ' Unless government leaders have the good o f every person in mind when
m ak in g

decisions they would not be concerned with aid per capita; and since

governments are concerned with winning the siq)port o f only a majority, in most cases,
the good o f the whole is discounted.

Second, if aid per capita was a vital factor in

winning a nation’s support the United States would have to invest the bulk o f its funds
into a few nations, such as India and China (PRC). However, this would be an irrational
approach to maximizing global support, as it requires the sacrifice o f many nations to
gain

the support o f two, as long as aid funds remain limited. If aid per capita is

important, the United States should focus its funds into smaller nations, which are more
numerous, and forgo providing aid to largCT populated states. However, this is not the
case either as both India and the PRC receive foreign aid fi:om the United States.
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the previous facts, using aid per capita is not a suitable choice for the strength o f aid
indicator.
The second strength o f aid measure is aid as a portion o f GDP. For this measure,
divide aid by total GDP, with a larger product signifying a greater strength o f aid. The
logic o f this indicator is that if aid makes up a large portion o f the GDP o f a nation it will
strive to protect the aid, especially in the case where aid is greater than GDP. This
counteracts the differences among nations, economically, and places the importance of
aid in clear relief. In addition, since this data is relatively easy to assemble, it is
accessible to policy makers in all nations. Further, building on the concepts o f the
comparative politics models, which looks at how aid keeps a governing body in power,
the larger the aid as a portion of the overall economy the more the government will be
able to do to maintain citizen support, at least majority support.
W ittkopf and Sexton and Decker found no connection between voting and aid as a
portion o f GDP. Only Rai found a coimection between the two and this was not a strong
connection. Given these results there is no need to test voting against aid as a portion of
GDP. Also, chapter six develops a new classifications scheme o f nations for this
research, in the classification scheme the economic development o f nations is a primary
factor and controls for the level o f economic development as this strength o f aid indicator
was designed to do.
Because o f the weakness o f alternative strength o f aid indicators, it is best to use
aggregate aid totals to compare potential influence among nations. W hile this is not an
ideal measure due to the differences among nations, all attempts to construct a better
measure have been unsuccessful. Due to the multitude o f differences between nations.
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strength o f aid indicators will not be successful because they can only control for one
variable at a time. Instead, what needs to be constructed is a classification scheme for
nations that controls for as many im portant variables as possible allowing for a test
between similar sets o f nations. Following this path eliminates the need for the strength
o f aid indicator and allows the use o f unaltered raw aid amounts. Developing this
classification scheme will be the topic o f the next chapter.

Conclusion
In the end, there are three im portant conclusions for this study. First, calculating
the amount o f aid a nation receives involves adding both military and economic aid.
Second, total aid calculations m ust include loans and grants. Although loans may be less
influential, they still exert some influoice on recipients that should not be lost Finally,
the best strength o f aid measure is total aid. The other ways to calculate the strength o f
aid measure fail to produce results any better then using total aid. Formula 4-1 shows
how to rewrite the formula o f influence to incorporate these findings.
Form ula 4-1

Influence = / (total aid, nation, vote)
With total aid defined as all m ilitary and economic aid whether loan or grants
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CHAPTERS

VOTES
When researching votes in the United Nations there are several important issues
to cover. First, is the United States concerned about w hat the United Nations does?
More specifically, is the US concerned about what the General Assembly does? If so,
why is the US concerned? Beyond the issue of whether or not the US is concerned with
the GA actions there is the question o f how to determine important votes for the United
States. Finally, how to count abstentions in studies o f aid and voting? This chapter will
cover these issues and outline how a study o f American foreign aid and UN voting should
confiront these challenges.

Does the United States Care About the United Nations?
It is an acceptable fact that the United States, along with most other nations, is
concerned about actions o f the United Nations Security Council. Since the Security
Council is empowered to make binding decisions for the entire organization, all members
must pay close attention to the actions this body/ However, the veto power o f the five
permanent members insures that the Security Council can not force the United States to
act against its will.^
While most researchers consider the Security Council important, the General
Assembly does not share this position o f prominence. Many scholars feel the GA is

45
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unimportant since in most cases it can not make binding decisions/ If the General
Assembly is inconsequential or, more to the point, it is viewed as inconsequential by
policy makers, then it would be irrational for the United States to expend resources to
alter the actions o f the body. However, it is very clear that the United States does care
what the General Assembly does. In repeated scenes the Congress o f the United States
has taken issue with General Assembly actions and has attempted to draw attention to US
tools o f influence over nations in the UN. Undertaking a review o f all of these episodes
is not feasible; however, Heliodoro Gonzalez has compiled a particularly enlightening
narrative that reveals the depth o f US attention towards the UN.
In the early 1980s, the US Congress launched an investigation into the actions of
nations at the UN. This investigation protested that “the United States is subject to
irresponsible and irrelevant vilification and verbal assault.”^ In these hearings, the
members o f the committee proposed that nations consistently voting against the United
States, especially on important issues, should have their foreign aid packages altered as
punishment.^ They felt they could show their disapproval through bilateral aid
commitments.
The hearings are compelling evidence that the United States government is
concerned about the actions o f UN and GA. Nations mentioned by name in the
committee meeting were not members o f the Security Council and could only offend the
US in the General Assembly. The investigation and ensuing report also firmly
establishes the link between aid and voting. The members o f the committee, clearly,
stated that the two are not separate items. The connection between aid and voting was
made even stronger by recent Congressional actions, which ordered the annual report of
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voting habits in the UN to print the amount o f aid each nation receives next to the overall
voting percentages.
Congress has further solidified the connection between aid and voting with Senate
Bill 141^, entered by Senator Faircloth. Section 2 subsection A o f this bill reads
Prohibition. - Funds may not be obligated or expended in any fiscal year for
United States assistance for a foreign country if the government o f that country
did not cast its vote in agreement w ith the United States for at least 50 percent o f
the recorded votes taken in sessions o f the General Assembly and Security
Council o f the United Nations during the calendar year preceding the year in
which the fiscal year began.
This ties aid and voting together in the m inds o f members of Congress. If nations do not
vote with the United States then they are risking their American aid. Although this bill
did not become law, the Congress has incorporated the basic idea into other bills.
However, it does show, along with the statem ents firom the Congressional report above,
that Congress does care what happens in the United Nation General Assembly.
The actions o f Congress support w hat most scholars believe, that the United
States does take note o f GA decisions. B ailey and Davis state that “All nations pay some
heed to UN resolutions”.^ Most nations, including the United States, consider the
potential setbacks fix)m not conforming to resolutions as too great, even if it is only a
tarnished image.
Why must all nations pay heed to UN resolutions? The more sublime political
reasons previously alluded to are not the only important issues regarding UN resolutions.
Procedural issues also demand a nation's attention in the GA. A brief review o f both o f
the procedural and political reasons the GA is important will clarify this issue.
The General Assembly does possess select authority to make binding decisions
for the entire body. The first o f these binding authorities comes in the form o f the UN
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budget. The GA assesses the budget commitment for each member nation, based on
criteria that it outlines.^ The GA can commit nations to pay a set amount o f money into
UN accounts. As it currently stands, over half o f the members o f the GA contribute one
one-hundredth o f one percent o f the UN budget, while these same nations vote to force
the United States to pay twenty-five percent o f the total budget.’ Despite the fact that
nations can refuse to pay, which the US did, they eventual do pay the assessed fee,
making the GA an important factor.
The GA can also order the bureaucracy o f the UN to perform specific functions,
such as fact-finding missions.^’ These orders range from compiling reports to forming ad
hoc committees to investigate a certain issue. This may not bind a particular nation,
except in helping to pay for it, but it can prove very embarrassing for the nation that is
under investigation. This power to create reports and committees is a significant tool o f
influence for the GA providing it a degree o f importance.
The most important binding power o f the GA comes fix>m a procedure known as
‘Uniting for Peace’.*' Under Uniting for Peace the GA can assume control over an
outbreak o f hostilities and establish directives for how to deal with the situation,
including the deployment o f troops. Uniting for Peace can only happen if the Security
Council is grid locked by the veto o f one (or two) permanent members. When the
Security Council is grid locked the GA can pass recommendations that substitute for
Security Council directives.*^ W hile United for Peace resolutions take a two-thirds
majority, they have the same weight as Security Council decisions and constitute a shift
in power firom the Security Council to the GA. Although United for Peace has not
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happened often, it has taken place during some very important international crises such as
the Korean Conflict, the Soviet invasion o f Hungary, and Suez Crisis.*^
Several other issues under General Assembly control are important to the United
States despite not being binding. The first o f these is that the GA elects the non
permanent members o f the Security Council.'^ This often takes on a great deal o f
importance. While the United States may be able to block Security Council action with
the veto, it can not authorize favorable actions without a positive vote o f the majority of
nations. The requirement of a “positive” vote means that a majority o f the members of
the Security Council must vote in favor o f a resolution otherwise it is defeated. Further, a
majority o f nations can defeat a resolution by abstaining, called a “hidden veto”.*^ Thus,
in order for the United States to be able to claim it is following a UN resolution when it
acts, it must win the support o f non-permanent members as well as the permanent five
members. If the GA elects members that are unwilling to support American policies then
the United States can not employ United Nations resolutions to cover its foreign policy
goals. This has taken on greater importance in recent years as the United States has
sought to operate under the guise o f the UN, the best example of this being the Gulf War
against Iraq.
Another very important issue is that the GA votes to accept and expel members of
the UN. This ability is tempered by the fact the SC must make a recommendation first;
however, the GA is the final body to vote on these issues.*^ In order for the UN to accept
nations the United States sponsors, they must win majority support in the GA. It is
however agreed that permanent members can veto requests to join the UN before the
General Assembly has the opportunity to vote on admission.
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Further, the GA decides matters o f credentials, which means they determine who
is the actual representative from a nation. Most o f the tim e this is unimportant but takes
on great relevance in certain circumstances. This is true o f the United States efforts to
block the Peoples Republic o f China (PRC) from taking over the China seat in the UN.
In this case, the PRC applied to the GA for recognition as the rightful government of
China and to claim its seat in the UN. Since this was a m atter of representation and not
membership, the United States could not act through the Security Council.*^ This forced
the United States to attempt to block the entry o f the PRC through the GA by denying it
the needed two-thirds support to win the seat.*^ In this role, the decision o f the GA took
on great importance to the United States. Allowing an enemy to join at the same time
expelling an ally would have been a great loss for the United States.
Finally, the GA elects the Secretary-General o f the UN.” The Secretary-General
is the chief executive o f all UN organs and can attend, without voting privileges, both
Security Council and GA meetings. Again, the Security Council forwards a nomination
to the GA for its consideration and in most cases, the GA accepts the Security Council's
decision, but it is not bound to do so. Even if the United States wins a vote on its
preferred candidate a divided vote in the GA could be embarrassing for the United States,
especially in the hands o f anti-American propagandist.
Along with the procedural issues that m ake the GA critical there are larger
political realities that require the United States to take notice o f what the GA does. While
these issues are more subtle than the issues above they are still o f great relevance.
The UN and GA by design bear a certain m oral authority.^® This authority comes
from the GA’s universal nature; it is supposed to be the representative o f all the world’s
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people. Further, the UN has a broad base o f support both in the United States, which is
one o f the most skeptical o f nations, and in the world. Given these facts, "... most
governments will still try to avoid a direct confrontation with, or condemnation by, the
General Assembly.”^* Further, since the United States attempts to wrap its foreign policy
in moral righteousness it can not accept the condemnation o f the UN. This is especially
true in the current Iraqi situation where the U nited States has taken the moral high ground
o f iq)holding world peace and defending the weak. If the GA ever votes against United
States policies in the G ulf region, it would force American policy makers to put a new
spin on events, a spin that might undermine dom estic support.
Issues o f prestige also arise in the GA. Hans Morgenthau stated clearly that
nations could not allow the tarnishing o f their prestige in international relations. Once
this happens, other nations will view the defamed power as weak or in decline, which
could lead to challenges for authority, which is what every hegemonic power seeks to
avoid. Although losing an important vote in the GA is not catastrophic, it could signal
other nations to challenge US policies through the UN. Thus, the United States expends
great effort to avoid critical defeats, or at least to avoid losing by a large margin.^
It should be clear from the discussion above that decisions made in the General
Assembly concern the United States. Through procedural and political issues, the GA
can exert great influence over UN and world politics. Even though the GA is weaker
then the Security Council, it is still important to the United States. Due to this
importance, the United States attempts to control certain actions taken by G oieral
Assembly.
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Important Votes
W hile it is apparent that the United States cares about the actions o f the General
Assembly, it is also apparent that not all actions vitally importance to the United States.
Instead, a sub-group o f votes exists which critically concern the United States. Up to this
point, researchers have made no effort to distinguish between these groups o f votes.
W ittkopf did not distinguish between important and peripheral votes; instead testing aid
against all votes. This section challenges the practice o f not separating these votes and
discusses guidelines for determining an important vote from an unimportant one.
W ittkopf never defended or explained his decision not to separate important
votes, so examining his logic is not possible. Further, since all other studies relied upon
W ittkopf no published arguments exist in favor o f separating these votes. A possible
explanation is that since the State Department did not provide a list o f important votes
when W ittkopf performed his study he did not feel it was a necessary issue to consider.
Instead, this section makes the argument for differentiating the two types o f votes. This
will lead directly to the method for determining an important vote.
As should be apparent the United States is not profoundly concerned with all
issues attended to in the General Assembly. La fact, o f the hundreds o f votes that
a n n u a lly

take place there may be only about twenty o f vital interest. Past studies have

asserted that if aid wins support, increased stq)port w ill be evident in all actions, even if
unimportant to the donor. However, it seems an irrational waste o f scarce resources for
the United States to use its influence to alter votes on items o f no relevance. While
nations may agree with the position o f the United States on these peripheral matters and
vote with them, the United States would not waste its influence to alter these votes.
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Instead, the United States, and any donor nation, would save their influence for important
issues. To follow Morgenthau’s analogy, donor nations would only bribe other nations
on issues o f great concern. Thus, any test o f aid and influence should place emphasis on
the issues important to the donor.
This logic holds tme for recipient nations as well. It is irrational to expect nations
to accept aid if they must alter all o f their actions to satisfy the donor. Instead, the
recipients are willing to alter select actions in exchange for foreign aid. No nation would
be willing to trade all o f its sovereignty for aid, at least not for the amount o f aid that the
United States can provide. Thus, from both perspectives it is unlikely that a donor of aid
attempts to alter all votes in the UN. Instead, aid is a tool to influence votes on select
issues.
How can researchers tell an important vote from a peripheral one? The best
^proach is to rely upon individual government statements concerning what they regard
as important votes. It is possible to design strict criteria to categorize votes as important
or not. However, if individual governments pressure recipient governments to act in a
certain matter, it is the individual government’s view o f important issues that is
consequential.
However, since a governmental agency may be under pressure to demonstrate its
effectiveness there should be som e general criteria outlined. This w ill allow researchers
to shift through government statements and ensure that they are not receiving biased
information slanted towards success. In addition, since, unlike the United States, not all
nations publish their important votes these criteria are applicable to other nations.
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There are five factors to determine the relative importance o f individual issues.
First, anything binding must be important to a nation. If the United States is committed
to taking certain actions by a GA resolution, it will use its influence to ensure the
achievement o f its most favorable outcome. The best example o f this is the Uniting for
Peace resolution. Especially since the United States no longer controls the majority in
the General Assembly on a regular basis, it fears the use such resolutions against
American interests.^ Budget resolutions also fall into the category o f committing
actions. However, since these resolutions h^>pen yearly, only resolutions that drastically
alter the funding commitments are important, under normal circumstances. Exceptions to
this may arise if the current United States administration is particularly anti-UN or has
campaigned heavily to reduce the United States share o f the payments.
The second factor is if the resolution deals directly w ith the United States. The
UN occasionally passes resolutions regarding American actions, such as the recent
bombing o f Afghanistan and the Sudan. In its own defense the United States, and any
other nation, will attempt to weaken the language in the resolution; or try to demonstrate
that the entire UN is not against the action taken by creating a large bloc o f nations
against the resolution. An example o f this comes fiom GA resolutions condemning the
mining o f Nicaraguan harbors by the United States in the 1980s.^'* The same premise
would apply to any reports about domestic policy negative towards the United States.
Further, any resolution that deals with a close ally is important. The United States
will not allow the GA to denounce an ally, because it can amount to attacking US
pohcies. The United States demonstrates this by its continued attempts to shield Israel
from negative resolutions debated by the GA. The United States has consistently fought
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in support o f Israel and other close allies. In the case o f Israel the United States normally
loses, but does attem pt to weaken the voting coalition against Israel.^ In 1995, the GA
passed two such resolutions dealing with Israel, A/Res/50/73 and A/Res/50/129.^^
Although the United States agreed substantively with the resolutions, the United States
believed that both resolutions attacked Israel unwarrantedly and attempted to defeat both
o f them. This shows that the United States provides protection to its aUies, especially in
the case o f Israel.
Any resolution concerning an enemy state is important, especially if the resolution
condemns the state o r is an attempt to end punishment against a state. The United States
has repeatedly ensured that Saddam Hussein could not gain a political victory by having
the GA condemn the embargo against Iraq. The United States has also vigorously fought
criticism o f its Cuba policy.
Finally, issues o f UN reform will take on great importance to most nations and
certainly the United States. The United States has historically viewed the UN as a tool
for American world leadership, designed to help maintain the current world order.

Any

attempt to alter the balance o f power, in the UN or any organ such as the GA, is
important. The U nited States favors only change within the current system, not changes
to the system itself.^* Any attempt to alter the current balance o f power, as currently
debated in regards to the Security Council, must have the approval o f the GA and would
be significant to the U nited States as the global hegemonic power.
In this study, official United States government statements regarding votes w ill be
used to determine w hich votes are considered as important. These statements will be
drawn from the anniial State Department report to Congress entitled Voting Practices in
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the United Nations for the years o f this study, 1995-97, as long as they meet the general
criteria outlined above. Appendix 1 provides a complete list and brief review o f these
important votes.

Abstentions and Absent
The final issue dealing with votes is how to confront nations that do not vote on a
particular resolution. Currently there are four options for nations' vote: yes, no, abstain,
and absent^’ Since nations do not have to choose to support a resolution directly, it is
difficult to determine if a vote is supportive or not, a fact that past studies have not taken
into account, histead, they have tested whether or not a nation voted identically to the
United States. Only when a nation voted the same way is it supporting the United States,
if not they were in opposition. Abstention and absence are not necessarily opposition.
The first issue to deal with is absence. If a nation is not present at the tim e of
voting then they can neither support nor oppose an issue. However, they may be absent
to protest the vote taking place, it is something that does not happen often in the GA o f
the 1990s. Usually, when a nation is not present to vote it is due to a collapse o f
government at home and not due to protest^® Further, when nations are absent they tend
to miss the entire session. Any nation absent for a majority o f the votes will not be a part
o f the sample o f nations. Absent votes will not count when figuring vote support for the
United States if a nation misses only few votes, unless there exists substantial evidence to
support the claim that the nation is absent to protest the entire proceeding.
In the case o f abstentions, the issue is much less clear. Lijphart first began to
experiment with the m ultiple meanings o f abstentions.^* He determined that an
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abstention is neutral, neither helping nor hurting any nation. Lijphart decided that
abstentions should count as half a point when calculating voting agreement, an identical
vote being one and opposite vote being zero. While this is a vast improvement over past
conceptualizations o f abstentions, it does not fully explain how a nation may employ an
abstention.
The GA, as w ith m ost legislative bodies, makes the majority o f decisions in
private meetings, not on the floor o f the assembly.^" Nations are able to ‘count votes’ in
advance o f the public vote which is taken more for outside appearance than to resolve the
issue. When taking a vote nations know how their vote will affect other nations,
including those that provide them foreign aid. Thus, they can calculate if their donor
nation is going to win an important vote or not. This allows them to abstain tactically
when they are sure the donor nation will achieve their desired outcome. Therefore,
whether an abstention is supportive or not, depends upon the outcome o f the vote. If the
donor nation wins the vote, however that may be deiSned, then an abstention is supportive
o f the donor nation. If the donor loses the vote then an abstention becomes a nonsupportive vote. W hile the recipient nation did not openly defy the donor nation, it did
not come forward and support it either. As a result, studies comparing support and
foreign aid must examine abstentions on an individual basis, not as a whole as past
studies have done.
Even the design above is not perfect It is not hard to envision a scenario where a
recipient must not oppose a resolution for domestic pohtical reasons, but at the same time
does not wish to conflict w ith a donor nation. Therefore, the nation chooses the middle
ground o f abstention. Yet, the abstention could be supportive, since the recipient altered
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their behavior to protect their aid. This is the quintessential definition o f influence.
However, attempting to determine why nations take the m iddle ground in specific cases
would be a massive undertaking and would m ost likely not alter the final results in a
dramatic fashion due to the lower number o f occurrences. Therefore, even though the
method for dealing with abstentions outlined in the paragraph above is not perfect, it is
the best option for research o f this nature.

Conclusion
There are three conclusions drawn fix>m this chapter. First, the United States, and
most nations o f the world, are concerned with the actions o f the United Nations General
Assembly. However, the issue that is under consideration in the GA shapes this concern.
The United States is not concerned with every issue the GA covers. Instead, it reserves
its influence for a select sub-set o f issues that are important to US policies. Any test o f
aid and UN voting must concentrate on these matters and not the entire array o f the GA’s
agenda. Finally, voting in the GA is not as clear as past studies have attempted to make it
appear. Absences and abstentions make the issue o f comparing votes much more
difficult. However, it is possible to understand and employ these votes in this form o f
research with the ^ p licatio n o f a few simple rules. In the end, it is possible to rework the
formula o f influence to include these ideas as in Formula 5-1.

Formula 5-1
Influence = / (total aid, important votes, nation)
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CHAPTER 6

CLASSIFYING NATIONS
The final variable in the formula o f influence is nations, hi order to understand
how aid influences nations it is necessary to compare among sim ilar nations. Early
studies, such as W ittkopf s, treated all nations the same, then researchers began to classify
nations to help eliminate intermediate variables interfering with the correlations. Sexton
and Decker attempted the most complex classification scheme; however, as demonstrated
in chapter three it contained only four different types o f nations, which is clearly an
oversimplification. This chapter will layout a new classification scheme for the test o f
aid and UN voting.

What is Important?
What are the central factors influencing individual relations between nations?
Specifically, what variables would lead nations to agree or disagree on issues? The
obvious response to such a question is that it depends on the issue. However, this returns
researchers to an overly narrow scope. What need to be established are variables that
account for a nation’s stance on an array o f issues. Then it will be possible to classify
nations in similar blocs to test the influence of an outside variable, such as foreign aid.
In this search for national indicators there are abundant possibilities. G eogr^hy,
history, economic conditions, internal political structure, internal economic structure,
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level o f development, existence o f opposition groups*, and cultural traditions are all
variables that impact a nation’s external relations. However, if all o f these variables were
used to create a classification scheme every nation would comprise a group o f one
because every nation has trademarks that no other nation shares. To avoid dividing
nations into groups o f one requires the use o f a few significant variables to create groups
that are large enough for internal comparisons; but narrow enough to have real meaning.
There has been little work done in this regard, perhaps because this type o f
research falls between the sub-disciplines o f international relations and comparative
politics. Since such work would comprise a far-reaching research project o f its own, this
study will outline what the m ost probable variables are and how to employ them in
research.
This chapter will discuss only the three m ost prominent variables. These are type
o f government, geographic location, and level o f economic development. The three
chosen variables have a great impact on the external relations o f all nations, which is the
primary concern here. These three variables interact with most global issues and
predispose a nation towards certain pohcy alternatives. By ignoring the natural
dispositions o f nations, past studies assumed all nations approached votes in the UN as a
blank slate with foreign aid deciding their vote. However, research must account for
preset preferences and designs that every nation has when entering votes. Foreign aid
must overcome national preferences if it is to influence voting in the United Nations.
Only by placing sim ilar nations together will it become clear whether aid influenced
votes.
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Type o f Government
Though realist theory dictates that type o f government has no effect on a state’s
international relations, other perspectives suggest the type o f government a nation has
may determine its views on certain international issues/ This dispute requires some
elaboration provided in a brief overview o f the central issues follows.
On the international level, one o f the most discussed topics is human rights. With
the recent expansion o f this topic, it now encompasses a w ide range o f issues. One of
which is the political rights o f individuals, particularly the right to vote and have political
representation. This issue will naturally meet with resistance from certain types o f
governments while viewed as natural by others.
A totalitarian regime, either monarchical or dictatorial in nature, will not accept
the idea o f popular sovereignty. Allowing the nation’s citizens to vote could jeopardize
the government’s power, or even its claim to power. Thus, when any voting rights issue
arises in the General Assembly, totalitarian governments would likely be negatively
predisposed towards the resolution. On the other hand, a m ore liberal democratic regime,
which could include constitutional monarchs, would beheve the right to vote is
fundamental for citizens. In this case, the government would be positively predisposed

towards the issue and would have a natural position on the topic. This does not take into
account the view o f second world nations that believe voting is permissible as long as the
communist party is the only entity on the ballot
From one brief example it is clear the type o f government a nation has is a very
important variable in international relations; granted, this importance shifts depending on
the issues. However, not controlling for this variable can distort the results o f a study o f
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this nature. If a nation such as Saudi Arabia, an absolute monarchy, votes against a
representation resolution while Chile, a democracy, votes for it, can these two votes be
taken as equal in supportive value. In short, did Chile support the United States,
assuming a positive vote, while Saudi Arabia did not? In the direct sense, Saudi Arabia
did not support the United States but Chile did, but was the United States the critical
factor? In this case, it is unclear due to differences in government and the philosophies
that provide their legitimacy.
Creating an accurate classification scheme o f governments w ill counteract these
differences. By classifying govermnent types, it would be possible to test the impact of
an outside variable, such as aid, without the intermediate interference o f government
types. In short, it would be possible to test the realist theory o f aid on more homogenous
sets o f nations.
However, an appropriate classification scheme is not obvious. The first attempt in
aid studies at this type o f classification had only two types o f govermnents, totalitarian
and non-totalitarian.^ This is clearly an over-simplification and fails to achieve anything.
For example, it classifies nations such as Saudi Arabia and the People’s Republic of
China as totalitarian. Clearly, these nations do not share the same natural governmental
dispositions, especially since the latter governments political philosophy calls for
overthrowing o f the former. The non-totalitarian category in turn overlooks such
differences as presidential versus parliamentary systems and direct vs. indirect elections,
all o f which could have an impact depending on the issue. In addition, it becomes very
difScult to determine what is non-totalitarian. No government claims to be a totalitarian
regime and the difference is not always easy to qualify.
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Past works on voting blocs support these logical arguments. Although they do not
perfectly match the topic at hand, they do follow the basic idea. These studies attempt to
determine the reasons behind the existence o f voting blocs by determining the
characteristic that defines blocs. For example, Hovet does not discuss the existence of
any blocs based on type o f government. The closest type discussed by Hovet is
“Common Interest Groups”, which are economic and colonial based groups, not
political.** Lijphart’s voting bloc study does not identify a connection between types of
government and voting. Despite the fact that his study did not set out to test this
proposition directly, it is clear from the data that government type was not a signification
factor.
Finally, a review o f current blocs in the United Nations supports the findings from
Hovet and L ijphart The are no current blocs in the United Nations associated by type o f
government. In fact, when reporting voting practices in the United Nations the US
Department o f State does not separate voting by government type. They employ a
variety o f other separating techniques such as geography and cultural factors, but without
any attempt to explore governmental differences.^
Due to these immense difGculties, there w ill be no classification by government
type. While it is true that government type does affect a nation’s voting in the United
Nations on select issues, these topics will not arise under this study because the types of
issues that government classification would impact w ill not rise to the level o f important
resolutions for the United States as outlined in chapter five. It is clear finm the history o f
American foreign policy that ensuring everyone the right to vote is not o f m ajor concern;
in fact, the United States has long siqiported and defended undemocratic regimes.^
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Geography
Geography in a strict sense can provide the researcher w ith a great deal o f
knowledge about a particular nation. Due to the overlap o f many im portant factors, such
as common history, culture, and linguistic traits, the geographic location o f a nation is a
strong indicator o f a nation’s characteristics. However, the definition o f geography is
broader for this research. The purpose o f the geographic indicator is to signify major
political subdivisions in the world.^
This is not an over extension o f the term geography. In his groundbreaking
research on UN bloc politics, Thomas Hovet discovered that geographic groupings are
very similar to caucus groups inside the GA. He further determined that m ost subgroups
in the UN closely resembled geographic groupings.* Based on this research, it is possible
to place nations into homogenous geographic groups, without perform ing in-depth
studies o f each individual nation.
There are two important points o f clarification before dividing the nations into
these sub-groups. First, Hovet found that the issue under consideration was very
important to the creation of these subdivisions.^ Although this is a serious research issue,
it appears that apart from a microanalysis o f single votes there is little to do to correct it.
However, the second criteria for classifying nations, economic development, will provide
a control for issues related to breakdowns o f group cohesiveness, especially since the
m ajor issues in the GA o f the 1990s concern economic issues. Second, Hovet’s
classification scheme is very old, designed in the m iddle o f the Cold War. In fact, one o f
his groupings no longer exists, the Eastern Bloc. Due to changes that have occurred over
tim e making adaptations to Hovet’s scheme will update it for the modem UN. The
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placement o f nations in these political subdivisions occupies the rest o f this section.
Provided in this chapter is a brief overview and a full listing o f all categories is available
in Appendix 2.
It is important to remember in this process that the purpose o f this division is to
place nations into homogenous sub-fields. W hile these sub-fields will follow traditional
geographic lines there are special cases placed in different geographic categories or
separated into categories o f their own. The reasons for these changes are different with
every case but share one common theme. The geographic designation is more than
location, it groups nations having the same regional outlook, strategic concerns, and
broadly speaking, cultural backgrounds. Nations singled out for special treatment, or
placed in different sub-categories, have important idiosyncrasies deserving individual
attention.
The first geogr^hic category is Latin America. This category consists o f all
nations from Mexico to Argentina and the Caribbean states. It may seem prudent to place
Cuba outside this grouping given its adversarial relationship with the United States, a
relationship that is not currently shared by other Latin American nations, at least not to
the same degree. However, the conflict with the United States is the only major
difference between Cuba and the rest o f the Latin American nations. Although important
to keep in m ind when e x a m in in g the results o f this study, the Cuba-American rivalry is
not sufScient to place Cuba in a separate category.
The second geogn^hic category is W estern Europe. This category includes
Canada, Greenland, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Greece, and all other European nations
that were not under Soviet domination during the Cold War. While the Cold War status
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o f each nation is not an important factor, it is the point o f demarcation between two
drastically different groups. Despite the fact that Eastern European nations desire to join
the ranks o f the Western European nations they have not reached that point yet and that
represents a clear division between East and West Europe. This division is important
enough to warrant the creation separate groups. If the United States were not the donor
under study in this research, it would be located within the Western Europe category.
The third grouping is Eastern Europe. This group includes the former Soviet Bloc
countries, including the new nations that have formed out o f Yugoslavia, the Baltic
States, Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia. While Russia does extend into the Asian region its
historical background is European and not Asian making it fit better with the Eastern
European grouping.
The fourth geographic group is the Middle East and North Afiica. W hile this
region includes many nations, running from Morocco in the west to Kazakhstan in the
East, these nations have similar background, especially religion. Clarify this region
requires an in-depth explanation o f its confines. It starts with Morocco in the west and
continuing across the top o f Africa to Egypt It also includes the traditional M iddle East,
which extends from the Arabian Peninsula north to Turkey and then across to Iran. For
this research, the region will also include the starts (or homelands) created by the coU ^se
o f the Soviet Union as well as Afghanistan. Despite the fact that these nations are not
traditionally associated with the Middle East, share strong similarities.
There are two nations in the Middle East/North Africa grouping to separate for
individual treatment. The first is Israel, which does not share many common features
with its surrounding neighbors. In fact, one o f the common features o f countries in this
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region is support o f the Palestinians against Israel, hicluding Israel in comparisons o f
this region would skew any results; instead, the correct placement for Israel is with the
Western European category. The other nation that requires special consideration is
Turkey. Although Muslim and Arabic, Turkey has strong connections with Europe, even
joining NATO. This would alter its voting in the General Assembly compared to other
nations in this region. Similar to the solution for Israel, the correct placement for Turkey
is with the Western European category.
The fifth geographic group o f nations is South Africa. This group consists o f
nations on the African continent that do not fall into the Middle East and North African
group with the addition o f Madagascar. Sub-Saharan nations, traditionally grouped
together in classification schemes, posses shared histories and concerns make them a
natural category for broad ranging comparisons. In this region, the only nation requiring
special attention is South Africa. W hile it has changed rapidly over the past ten years, it
still does not belong with other African nations. Its strong European background and
minority population gives South Africa a very distinctive outlook and unusual
connections to other nations that alters their voting in the General Assembly. Further, the
fact South Africa is the only African nation possessing nuclear weapons makes it even
more unsuited for the sub-Saharan African category.

Following other studies, therefore.

South Africa will be in the Western European category. Although not a perfect match,
the Western European group is the best choice fiar South Africa. ' *
The sixth geographic grouping o f nations is the Indian Subcontinent. This region
will consist o f the nations o f Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh. This is a rather
small grouping o f nations, but a necessary one. These nations share unique
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characteristics and historical experiences that would make them peculiar in either the
Middle East category or the Asian Pacific category. The past British dominance,
religious diversity, and intense conflicts gives these nations a singular outlooks that
would have an impact on their support levels for different policies.
The seventh, and final, category consists o f mainland Asia and the Pacific Region.
This group consists o f the nations occupying the rest o f the Eur-Asian landmass and the
island nations of the Pacific. This group stretches fiom Australia in the South to
Mongolia in the North and runs from W estern China to the western coast o f the North
and South American continents. These nations share a long history o f interaction and
cultural similarities. They also share distinctive security concerns making them a natural
grouping. Inside the Asia Pacific category, the Anzus nations, Australia and New
Zealand, do not share the co m m o n background o f the other nations in the group. Their
historical and cultural backgrounds are W estern European in origin.

Even though they

share the security concerns o f nations in the region, they are too different to classify with
the Asia Pacific group. Instead, the Anzus nations belong in the category o f Western
European.
Despite not following traditional geographic breakdowns, this geographic
classification scheme does provide a better ty p o lo ^ for studying nations. With this
classification, it is possible to study the impact o f aid upon nations possessing similar
political attitudes and agendas. These groupings divide the nations o f the world into
homogenous groups making a true comparison between UN votes and aid possible. The
final intermediate variable research can control for is different levels o f economic
development inside each category.
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Economie Differences
The division o f nations into regional categories creates broad homogeneous
groups for comparing aid and UN voting. However, it is not perfect. There are other
intermediate variables that interfere with the study. The variable o f greatest importance
is level of economic development among nations. In each o f the regional categories exist
diverse economic development levels. This diversity affects issues a nation will support
in the United Nations. Developing nations favor redistributive programs while developed
counterparts support these programs less. Further, this research theorized that less
developed nations experience a stronger need to ensure continuation o f their foreign aid
donations. Since developing nations command fewer resources they must rely upon
outside assistance to develop economically. To protect their foreign aid donations,
developing nations should perceive greater pressure than developed nations to vote with
donor. To control for effects from economic development, the level o f economic
development o f each nation w ill further divide them inside o f each geographic category.
The economic categorization uses the individual nation’s gross domestic product
(GDP) per c ^ ita . This provides a true estimate o f economic development for each
nation. Using pure GDP does not work because it only provides total amount o f
production o f a nation without controlling for demands placed upon production by
citizens o f the nation. Dividing the GDP by total population o f a nation controls for these
demands on production, while at the same time controlling for size variations among
nations. GDP per capita provides the average amount o f production each citizen can
consume, a statistic comparable between nations and between points in time. It is
important to note that not all experts believe GDP per capita is an appropriate measure o f
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a nation’s economic development. Dogan and Kazancigil state that national averages are
not good statistics to employ because there is too much variance among nations and their
reporting methodology.'^ Dogan and Kazancigil further state that GDP is imperfect
because it does not include the '"Black Economy”, unreported work and sales, that exists
in every nation.'** However, they do not offer an alternative method for determining
economic development levels o f a nation. They propose a complex index o f multiple
variables, but never create one. Although GDP per capita is not perfect, it is the best
alternative for comparing economic development among nations.
For this study, there are three classifications o f economic development. These
represent modifications o f the classification scheme currently employed by the World
Bank. The W orld Bank has four categories o f nations divided as follows. The first
category is low income and comprises nations with per capita Gross National Product
(GNP) o f 725 dollars or less. The second category is lower-middle income and consists
o f nations between 726 and 2,895 dollars per person. The third category is upper-middle
income and covers the range between 2,896 and 8,955 dollars. The final category is high
income and covers nations with per c ^ ita GNP greater that 8,956 dollars.'^
This study combines the first two categories, low and lower middle, to form one
low-income category. There are two essential reasons for doing this. First, the difference
between the two categories is m in im a l; each represents the least developed nations o f the
world. N either o f the categories signifies an economy that is meeting the needs o f the
nation’s population. While it is useful for the purposes o f the World Bank to divide
nations in this manner, it will not aid this study to divide these nations. Second, using
four categories would reduce the number o f nations in each category, which will not

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

73
allow for adequate comparisons. Sub-dividing each regional category into three fields
w ill allow for a large enough number o f nations in each field for comparative purposes,
h i addition, this study uses GDP instead o f GNP. The use o f GDP is necessary because it
measures only production occurring inside a particular nation’s boundaries, while
excluding the production o f citizens located in other nations.'^ This provides an accurate
picture o f resources available to a nation, which makes it the better indicator.

Conclusion
This chapter provided a brief review o f the important characteristics o f nations, as
it pertains to voting in the UN. The list o f potential important characteristics has been
narrowed to two, geographic region and economic development, that provide for
homogeneous groupings o f nations without creating overly restrictive criteria. While
there are many more potential variables for the classification scheme they would not
clarify the results, but rather would make comparisons impossible by forming too narrow
o f categories. In the end, this chapter creates a concise classification scheme, using as
few variables possible, capturing the essential charactaistics o f each nation to allow for a
test o f a nation’s response to foreign aid. Formula 6-1 shows the formula o f influence
rewritten to incorporate these findings.

Formula 6-1
Votes = / (total aid, important votes, economic/geographic category of a nation)
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CHAPTER?

CONCLUSION
Before presenting the results o f this study there is a brief review o f the issues
covered, with emphasis placed on how this research differs from other voting and aid
studies. Following the presentation o f the results is a discussion o f the policy
implications along with possible alterations for future research on aid and United Nations
voting.

Review
Chapter one previews this work outlining the general question and methods of
research. C h u ter two reviews the theories concerning why nations provide foreign aid in
order for the reader to fully understand the different aspects o f the foreign aid issue and to
place this work among the volumes o f research performed in the past. This study places
heavy emphasis on international relations theories o f aid, which serve as the theoretical
tool o f this study, as elaborated by Hans Morgenthau. Chapter three reviews relevant
studies performed on aid and United Nations voting with specific attention on the
weakness o f these studies and how to improve the older designs.
Chapter four covered the question o f how to define and count foreign aid. It
establishes why military and economic aid must be included in any study involving aid as
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well as the need to count both loans and grants as part o f a nation’s aid package. In
addition, this chapter reviews the weakness of the strength o f aid indicators developed by
Rai, establishing that raw aid amounts are the best tool for measuring the im pact o f aid
upon recipient nations. Chapter five covers the issue o f votes in the United Nations. An
important part o f this chapter is the establishment o f the need to use im portant votes, as
defined by the donor nation, when studying the connection between aid and voting.
Further, this chapter explores the m ultiple meanings o f abstentions, determ ining the need
to explore individual votes before deciding whether an abstention is supportive or not.
Finally, chapter six outlines a new method for classifying nations in order to test the
impact o f aid within similar groups o f nations. The base o f this classification scheme is a
nation’s geographic location and level o f economic development.

1997 Results
After conducting the test o f aid and voting as specified in the previous chapters, it
is apparent that there is no clear answer to whether aid influences voting. The cases
smdied provide mixed results with certain classifications o f nations showing no
connection between aid and voting while others demonstrate a weak correlation. Despite
the fact that some o f the results that follow do present evidence to the contrary, it appears
the hypothesis that American foreign aid wins votes in the United Nations G aieral
Assembly is incorrect
To demonstrate the results o f the test it is necessary to explore each geographic
region separately, ordered by strength o f results, with the nations’ level o f economic
developmoit denoted in each case. Since the results fiom each year studied, 1995-1997,
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are almost identical this chapter will only present the graphs for 1997. The graphs for the
other two years are available in Appendix 3 for comparison and the data for each
category is available in Appendix 2.
The first region is the Asia Pacific. As is clear from Graph 7-1 voting patterns in
comparison to aid levels is almost random. There is no strong pattern among the points
together or divided by level o f economic development. As is also clear, the line o f best
fit for the low developed nations in this region is nearly straight. This indicates nations
vote with the United States at the same rate, regardless o f the amount o f aid received.'
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While the economic development o f the nations does not appear to play a strong
role in voting for the lower and middle group, it does seem to have an inq)act on the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

79
higher developed category. Two o f the three high developed nations vote with the United
States over eighty percent o f the time. Although not compelling by itself, it does lend
support to controlling for the level o f economic development.
The second region o f study is Eastern Europe. Again, the results are nearly
random with a tendency towards a negative correlation between aid and voting. The line
o f best fit for the low economic group is slightly positive, demonstrating a weak
connection between aid and voting. W hile the middle group’s line o f best fit is sharply
negative, however there are too few points to be reliable.^ Again, the tendency is against
any correlation with level o f economic development important but not decisive.
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The third category is Western Europe. As is evident fiom Graph 7-3^ there are
not enough nations receiving aid in W estern Europe to allow any firm conclusions to be
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diawn.^ This graph (along with 7-2) does present one important piece o f information;
geogrsq)hy does make a difference. In both o f the graphs the lower bounds are at fifty
percent support and above, meaning that all European nations support the United States
over h a lf the time. European nations vote with the United States at a much greater rate
than m ost regions despite the fact most do not receive foreign aid. The regional variable
is an important ingredient in United Nations voting; however, it is not dom in a n t.
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The fourth category is Latin America. In Latin America, the correlation between
aid and voting is in the predicted direction. Both lines o f best fit move in a positive
direction. However, the line for the middle developed group has too few points o f data to
be accepted. The line for the lower income group, based on a wider number o f cases.
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does represent a valid measurement o f aid and voting. As is clear however, it is flat;
indicating a constant voting rate regardless of level o f aid received.
g
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The nations o f the Indian Subcontinent comprise the fifth region in this study.
However, there are only four nations in the sample, which is inadequate to draw firm
conclusions. Despite being too small, this grouping should not m erge with other groups;
its uniqueness demands its continued separation. Combining this group with another
would distort the impact o f aid and voting for the new enlarged grouping, which is
exactly what this research sought to avoid by dividing the nations.
Despite the small size o f the Indian Subcontinent group, it is ^>parent that there is
no connection between aid and voting. The line o f best fit is negatively sloped. Further,
the nation that receives the most aid tied for the lowest percentage o f supportive votes,
which is directly counter to expectations.
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The Middle East/North Africa is the sixth group in the study. This group displays
the strongest correlation between aid and voting so far. In the Middle East, both lines o f
best fit move in the predicted direction with the greatest strength.^ However, as in the
case o f Latin America the line for the middle income group relies upon too few points.
However, unlike the Latin American groiq) the line of best fit for the poor nations is not
fiat, which shows there is some coimection between aid and voting. While not strong, the
connection is discernible. It is im portant to note that poor nations in this region are non
oil producing states, most o f which have large populations. Thus, these governments
have to provide for a large population without the benefit o f a reliable source o f income.
This could account for an increased reliance on foreign aid that allows donor nations
greater influence.
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REGION: Middle East/North Africa
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The final region is South Africa, and it posses the strongest correlation between
aid and voting. As is seen in Graph 7-7 the line o f best fit for the middle group moves in
the wrong direction. Again, the line for this group in not based on enough points to
consider reliable. However, the line for the lower developed nations is reliable and
moving in the correct direction. Further, the diagram as a whole demonstrates the general
tendency to move from left to right and bottom to top, which is what should happen if a
linkage between aid and voting exists. However, the connection is still weak.
While a complete explanation o f the deviation o f South Afiica is not possible
here, there is one fact that might explain the stronger findings in this region. The nations
o f South Afiica are among the poorest on the face o f the earth. The level o f poverty in
these nations may be so great as to force governments to secure aid at any cost, thus
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making the pressure to vote with a donor, such as the United States, extreme. It may be
the case that excessively poor nations perceive the need to vote with donor nations while
more developed nations, that are still low in development status, do not. The findings in
the lower developed nations of the Middle East/North Afiica grouping support this
explanation. Extreme poverty may be a strong factor in recipient support for donors.
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hi the end, there are six valid sets o f data, with the Indian Sub-continent being too
small for any conclusions. O f the six three show signs o f aid and voting being linked,
however the connection is minimal in one case, with only the Afiican region showing any
true correlation between aid and voting in the predicted direction. The remaining three
cases all show the correlation between aid and voting to be negative o r non-existent
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Thus, the only conclusion to draw from this study is that aid does not win support from
nations in the United Nations General Assembly.
While there ^ipears to be no connection between foreign aid received and support
for the United States in the United Nations there is a connection between aid and a
nations decision to abstain from voting. Chapter five hypothesized that nations would
use abstentions tactically to avoid voting against an important resolution to the donor
United States. The evidence supports this assumption and the need to reevaluate the
meaning o f abstentions. When national support percentages were adjusted based on their
abstentions for issues the United States was successful in winning, 74% o f the nations
receiving aid in 1997 had their rates o f support increase. Even more impressive is the
fact that if European nations are not counted the rate rises to 87%. This evidence is not
decisive but does indicate that recipient nations use abstention to avoid voting against the
United States on issues they can not openly support or advocate.

Policy Implications
The implications for American foreign policy, especially foreign aid policy, are
clear. If Congress expects aid should win votes in the United Nations, as shown in the
fifth chapter, then they must explicitly state the connection between aid and voting. Even
beyond the Congress, the American government as a whole m ust make the connection
clear at every possible opportunity. Only unified action between the Congress and the
executive will be able to make nations realize what the United States expects in exchange
for foreign aid, assum ing that votes are a true priority.
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Congress has moved in this direction by printing the amount o f total aid received
by a nation next to its voting percentage in the State Departm ent’s armual report to
Congress regarding voting in the United Nations. However, they have not accompanied
this action w ith a straightforward statement such as the one proposed by Senator
Faircloth. Only this form o f blatant action will create the results presumably desired by
Congress.
Further, the United States must realize that aid appears more suited to avoid
opposition to policies than to wiiming support for them. Nations seem less willing to
support American policies that are not in their best interest, but inclined to avoid openly
opposing the United States on these same issues. Employed tactically, and with the aid
o f a large enough coalition in the General Assembly, the United States will be able to
ensure the passage, or defeat, o f its important resolutions.

Future Research
Adjustments in any research design can sharpen results; further, changing
circumstances m ight alter the outcome o f this research. W hile it is impossible to cover

all the issues, a review o f the significant topics for future research is important and
provided here.
First, this type o f study needs repeating in the future to determine if the passage of
time will alter the outcomes. This research in not static, it is constantly changing and the
conclusions o f today will not be the same tomorrow. As Congress has moved, ever so
slightly, to make the coimection between aid and voting m ore concrete, nations around
the world m ay begin to reconsider their voting practices in the United Nations. Since the
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Congress has only recently begun making these changes, they have not had time to have
an impact y e t Further, as the international system moves farther away from the Cold
War, and into a new currently undefined system, the importance o f foreign aid or United
Nations decisions may increase causing a shift in national behavior. Either o f these
possibilities, or a combination, could lead to a new reality in global politics and cause the
link between aid and United Nations voting to become clear. Ignoring this issue in the
future because o f the results o f this and other studies would be unwarranted.
Second, this research does show that economic development levels o f recipient
nation affects its voting in the United Nations. Unfortunately, the current methods for
categorizing development do not allow for a full exploration o f this issue. There is still a
need for better ways to classify development that will more clearly define a nation’s
status and allow nations to be broken into smaller groups for comparisons.
Third, efforts must continue to understand the various uses o f a vote o f abstention.
In this study, the employment o f a very simple model demonstrated that nations could use
abstentions tactically. A more complex model needs to be developed that includes the
possibility o f the United States using aid to influence nations to abstain on votes it loses;
which m ight cause the resolution to lose moral authority, assuming the abstaining block
is large. It m ight also be helpful to limit the number o f abstentions that are incorporated.
This would entail adjusting national support figures for only those votes that the number
o f abstaining nations is large enough to alter the outcome o f the vote.
Finally, there is a need for a research effort that takes a more macro approach
instead o f studies focusing on votes of individual nations. It is clear finm data presented
above that the m ajority o f nations vote with the United States a majority o f the time. This
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ensures that the United States wins more important votes than it loses. This fact clouds
the results because nations are clustered together very tightly m a k in g m in o r deviations
statistically significant. Instead o f focusing on individual nation’s percentages it may be
more instructive to explore how the United Nations as a whole votes and aggregate
foreign aid increases or decreases. In other words, does more aid flowing to United
Nations members secure the will o f the United States overall, rather than among
ind iv id u a ls ?

This o f course would require a completely new methodology and data

covering the entire history o f the United Nations instead o f just a few years. By changing
the focus o f the research, to the United States winning overall votes instead o f individual
nation’s votes, the relationship between aid and voting may become clear.

Final Remarks
At the beginning o f this research, there were two central questions to answer.
Why do nations provide foreign aid and Does aid influence voting in the General
Assembly? This design has provided the clearest answer yet to whether or not aid
influences voting. Clearly, the answer is that aid and voting are not connected. While
this iq>holds the work o f past researchers, the conclusion o f this work are based on a more
detailed analysis than has been attempted in the past allowing for a firm dismissal, for
now, o f the idea that aid alters voting in the General Assembly.
Unfortunately, there is no answer for why nations provide foreign aid. This work
does not disprove the intonational relations theory that aid is a tool o f influence. It is
possible the exercise o f influence takes place in many other policy areas not covered
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here. W hat is safe to conclude is that foreign aid does not secure votes in the United
Nations or if designed for this purpose, it is not an effective instrument.
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Endnotes
1 There is no line o f best fit for the middle or high economic groups due to the
fact they do not receive any aid. Their lines are vertical.
2 The high category is constant and does not have a line o f best fit.
3 Do to distortions caused to the graph. Graph 7-3 excludes Israel.
4 The data does not allow for a line o f best fit for this graph.
5 Do to distortions caused to the graph. Graph 7-6 excludes Egypt.
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APPENDIX 1

1995 Important Votes
1. A/Res/50/9 - Concerning International Atomic Energy Agency and its involvement
with the establishment o f safeguards agreements with the Democratic People’s
Republic o f Korea. Also, calls o f both the DPRK and Iraq to come into compliance
widi IAEA agreements.
2. A/Res/50/10 - Calls on the United States to refiain from the embargo o f Cuba.
3. A/Res/50/21 - Welcomes recent attempts and designs o f the Middle East Peace
Process.
4. A/Res/50/38 - Calls o f colonial a d m in istrative powers to hold elections in their
territories to determine the wishes o f the people o f their territories regarding their
political future.
5. A/Res/50/71 - Calls on Israel and all Middle East nations to renounce nuclear
weapons and accept the Treaty on Non-Proliferation o f Nuclear Weapons.
6. A/Res/50/96 - Urges all nations to stop any coercive measures (political o r economic)
against developing nations.
7. A/Res/50/129 —States that Israeli settlements in Palestinian territory are illegal.
8. A/Res/50/140 —Reaffirms the right o f Palestinian people to self-determination.
9. A/Res/50/185 - Confirms the role o f the United Nations in aiding nations in
m a in ta in in g firee and fair elections.
10. A/Res/50/188 - Expresses concern regarding human rights in fran.
11. A/Res/50/191 - Condenms human rights abuses in fraq.
12. A/Res/50/193 - Condemns human rights abuses in the former Yugoslavia.
13. A/Res/50/197 - Express concern regarding human rights in Sudan.

91
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14. A/Res/50/198 - Calls on Cuba to pennit United Nations officials to perform their
duties in Cuba and to allow the people political rights such as assembly and
repression.
15. A/Res/50/199 - Condemns human rights abuses in Nigeria, particularly the execution
o f Ken Saro-Wiwa.

1996 Important Votes
1. A/Res/51/17 - Calls on all states to end any measures regarding an embargo o f Cuba.
2. A/Res/51/22 - Calls on all nations to end any coercive economic or political actions.
3. A/Res/51/29 - Welcomes the Middle East Peace process that has started.
4. A/Res/51/45M - Note the International Court of Justice’s opinion regarding the legal
use o f nuclear weapons.
5. A/Res/51/45S - Calls on all states to negotiate an agreement to ban anti-persormel
landmines.
6.

A/Res/51/82 - R ea ffirm s the Palestinian peoples right to self-determination.

7. A/Res/51/106-Condem ns human rights abuses in fraq.
8. A/Res/51/107 - Expresses concern regarding human rights abuses in Iran.
9. A/Res/51/112 - Expresses concern regarding human rights in Sudan.
10. A/Res/51/113 - Calls on Cuba to permit United Nations officials to perform their
duties in Cuba and to allow the people political rights such as assembly and
expression.
11. A/Res/51/116 - Condemns human rights abuses in the form er Yugoslavia.
12. A/Res/50/245 - Adopts the Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

1997 Important Votes
1. A/Res/52/10 - Calls on all states to end any measures regarding an embargo o f Cuba.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

93
2. A/Res/52/11 - Concerning International Atomic Energy Agency and its involvement
with the establishm ent o f safeguards agreements with the Democratic People’s
Republic o f Korea.
3. A/Res/52/38H - Calls on all states to intensify efforts to eliminate anti-persormel
landmines.
4. Motion - Procedural motion to have a separate vote for conferring on the Palestine
Liberation Organization the same rights and privileges o f member states, except
voting and candidature.
5. A/Res/52/114 - Reaffirms the Palestinian peoples right to self-determination.
6. A/Res/52/129 - Confirins the role of the United Nations in aiding nations in
m a in ta in in g free and fair elections.
7. A/Res/52/136 - Reaffirms the rights o f all people to develop.
8. A/Res/52/140 - Express concern regarding human rights violations in Sudan.
9. A/Res/52/141 - Condemns human rights abuses in fraq.
10. A/Res/52/142/ - Expresses concern regarding human rights violations in Iran.
11. A/Res/52/143 - - Calls on Cuba to permit United Nations officials to perform their
duties in Cuba and to allow the people political rights such as assembly and
expression.
12. A/Res/52/147 - Condemns human rights abuses in the former Yugoslavia.
13. A/Res/52/181 - Calls on all nations to end any coercive economic or political actions.
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APPENDIX 2

Country

Antigua
Argentina
Bahamas
Barbados
Belize
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Cuba
Ecuador
El Salvador
Grenada
Guatemala
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
Jamaica
Mexico
Nicaragua

1995
Aid*
Votes %**

0
0.6
0-7
0
3.9
69.2
9.1
6.5
27.9
6.3
0
14.5
63.6
0
39.2
5.8
160.5
30
24.1
10.4
31.3
Panam a
5.3
Paraguay
4.8
Peru
131.9
0.4
Suriname
Trinidad and Tobago 0.2
2.4
Uruguay
Venezuela
1.1

57.1
60
60
60
60
60
60
57.1
60
61.5
35.7
60
60
692
66.7
60
60
60
60
60
57.1
60
57.1
60
60
67.1
60
60

1996
Votes %**
Aid*

Latin America
0
0.588
0.816
0
1.239
80.474
5.167
1.955
16.213
2.137
0
13.185
27.757
0
31.496
3.205
123.667
27.871
14.407
5.433
22.076
4.982
4.301
92.507
0.817
0
1.58
0.928

66.6
66.6
72.7
66.6
66.6
66.6
66.6
66.6
66.6
60
41.6
66.6
72.7
72.7
70
66.6
72.7
72.7
66.6
66.6
70
66.6
66.6
66.6
66.6
66.6
72.7
66.6

1997
Vote
Aid*

0
0.6
1.1
0
1.248
97.69
13.605
1.684
30.6
1.127
0
15.533
30.738
0
38.176
3.672
97.373
28.789
14.371
24.216
23.258
4.259
8.232
99.844
1.017
0.1
1.096
0.95

94

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

66.7
69.2
69.2
66.7
66.7
69.2
69.2
69.2
61.5
69.2
38.5
69.2
72.7
69.2
69.2
69.2
66.7
66.7
69.2
69.2
72.7
75
69.2
69.2
66.7
69.2
69.2
69.2

95
Australia
0
Austria
0
Belgium
0
Canada
0
Cyprus
0
Denmaric
0
Finland
0
France
0
Germany
0
Greece
229.6
Iceland
0
Italy
0
Liechtenstein
0
Malta
0.1
Monaco
0
Netherlands
0
New Zealand
0
Norway
0
Portugal
0.5
Republic o f Ireland 39.2
South Africa
100.4
Spain
0.1
Sweden
0
Turicey
495.3
United Kingdom
0

Albania
Belarus
Bulgaria
Croatia
Czech Republic
Estonia
Hungary
Latvia
Lithuania
Macedonia
Poland
Romania
Russia
Slovak Republic

31.4
11.2
38.9
12.4
20
3.3
26.8
7.2
23.2
13.6
86.5
39.6
353.5
29.2

66.7
66.7
66.7
66.7
53.3
66.7
66.7
66.7
66.7
60
66.7
66.7
66.7
60
71.4
66.7
66.7
66.7
60
66.7
53.3
60
66.7
57.1
73.3

60
60
60
69.2
66.7
75
66.7
71.4
66.7
60
71.4
60
53.3
66.7

0
0
0
0
15
0
0
0
0
0.054
0
0
0
0.3
0
0
0
0
0.769
19.6
118.51
0.049
0
34.995
0
Eastern Europe
21.577
4.879
29.728
14.513
5.542
0.386
17.349
3.768
8.088
13.409
48.187
30.709
112.306
17.141

66.6
66.6
81.8
75
66.6
66.6
66.6
75
75
50
63.6
75
66.6
66.6
75
75
66.6
66.6
75
66.6
63.6
75
66.6
66.6
75

0
0
0
0
15
0
0
0
0
0.025
0
0
0
0.1
0
0
0
0
0.8
19.6
79.457
0
0
28.3
0

69.2
69.2
69.2
76.9
69.2
76.9
76.9
69.2
69.2
69.2
76.9
69.2
69.2
69.2
69.2
76.9
69.2
76.9
692
69.2
53.8
69.2
76.9
54.5
76.9

75
66.6
66.6
70
75
66.6
75
66.6
66.6
75
75
75
66.6
75

28.978
5.31
33.452
11.35
1.281
0.5
16.428
3.5
7.5
16.3
43.608
35.086
100.138
17.135

70
53.8
69.2
69.2
76.9
75
69.2
69.2
69.2
69.2
69.2
69.2
61.5
692
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Slovenia
Ukraine

Afghanistan
Algeria
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Bahrain
Iran
Jordan
Kazakhstan
Kuwait
Kyrgyz Republic
Lebanon
Libya
Morocco
Oman
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
Syria
Tajikistan
Tunisia
Turkmenistan
United Arab Emirate
Uzbekistan

Angola
Benin
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cameroon
Cape Verde
Chad
Congo
Cote d’Ivoire
Djibouti
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Ethiopia

3.6
179.5

60
60

12.4
0.1
52.5
9.8
0.1
0
21.8
40.2
0
25.2
13.8
0
15.8
0.1
0
0
0
8.4
3
5.5
0
11.7

Middle East/North Africa
45.5
50
15.2
60
0.075
66.6
50
76.531 50
66.7
45.5
11
80
64.3
0.108
26.7
20
0
110.002 58.3
64.3
21.365 66.6
60
72.7
61.5
0
12.874
58.3
66.6
0.474
58.3
50
18.1
20
0
17.651 63.6
57.1
54.5
46.2
0.119
46.2
55.5
0
63.6
50
0
33.3
28.6
0
3.37
50
72.7
1.669
66.6
60
33.3
3.401
0
72.7
61.5
0
10.293 80
77.8

44.8
20.5
32.3
15.9
5.1
4.3
8.4
5.3
5.4
1.9
2
0.3
10.6
119.8

66.7
60
60
60
61.5
60
66.7
57.1
70
60
50
87.5
70
57.1

1.016
75
144255 63.6

South Africa
55.076
15.144
2.23
13.394
2.569
3.621
7.28
5.896
1.061
1.636
0.15
0
13.124
105373

58.3
66.6
66.6
66.6
63.6
72.7
72.7
70
70
72.7
66.7
55.5
70
72.7

0.4
69.2
228.411 69.2

13.6
0.075
96.104
16.43
0.125
0
47.138
37.796
0
21.416
12.55
0
18.244
0.15
0
0
0
9.027
0.805
5.64
0
22.88

30
61.5
54.5
54.5
66.7
33.3
61.5
69.2
58.3
66.7
63.6
25
58.3
50
41.7
46.2
33.3
60
61.5
66.7
66.7
80

35.146
17.774
1.551
14.689
1.5
3.185
3.649
1.009
1.278
1.853
0.1
0
26.529
73.874

50
61.5
61.5
66.7
54.5
69.2
58.3
60
62.5
69.2
44.4
63.6
66.7
69.2
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Gabon
Ghana
Guinea-Bissau
Guinea
Kenya
Lesotho
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritania
Mauritius
Mozambique
Namibia
Niger
Nigeria
Rwanda
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Sudan
Swaziland
Tanzania
Togo
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe

Bangladesh
India
Pakistan
Sri Lanka

Bhutan
Brunei
China, PRC
Fiji
Indonesia
J^ an
Korea
Laos
Malaysia

2.7
39.4
6.7
19.9
26.7
10
30
68
34.9
2.7
0.2
66.9
17
19.1
2.9
166.1
25
10.1
30.1
13.5
31.5
4.2
58
29.7
21.8

64.3
46.7
66.7
64.3
60
53.3
57.1
53.8
60
57.1
60
66.7
57.1
53.3
23.1
80
54.5
66.7
26.7
60
53.8
53.3
53.3
50
57.1

146.9
164.6
17.1
13.3

Indian Subcontinent
53.3
76.121 60
161.512 33.3
40
46.7
50
6.493
12.479 58.3
53.3

0
0
0.6
0
61.6
0
0
2.2
0.5

64.3
53.3
33.3
66.7
40
66.7
60
45.5
53.3

2.493
48.276
7.323
15.601
15.718
2.077
20.589
31.297
31.297
2.194
0
45.428
6.881
6.315
1.67
118.362
22.15
26.748
23.521
0.832
9.239
1.861
39.749
13.157
16.092

Asia-Pacific
0
0
0.696
1.457
37.467
0
0.009
4
0.613

70
50
66.6
66.6
66.6
42.9
50
72.7
60
70
66.6
63.6
58.3
50
41.6
50
80
58.3
33.3
63.6
58.3
66.6
58.3
54.5
58.3

58.3
58.3
41.6
66.6
41.6
66.6
66.6
50
58.3

2.614
50.836
5.304
15.141
22.919
2.744
20.851
35.628
33.375
3.039
0.025
53.158
9.906
5.776
7
71.521
24.988
6.289
9.689
0.252
20.644
1.892
54.615
18.474
18.543

62.5
58.3
70
61.5
69.2
54.5
57.1
54.5
66.7
61.5
69.2
61.5
53.8
46.2
30.8
60
61.5
58.3
30.8
69.2
61.5
69.2
54.5
60
41.7

68.322
139.618
2.5
3.62

53.8
38.5
38.5
53.8

0
0
0.891
0
42.1
0
0
2.5
0.6

66.7
53.8
46.2
72.7
38.5
76.9
69.2
50
53.8

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

98
Maldives
Mongolia
Myanmar
N. Korea DPRK
Nepal
Papua New Guinea
Philippines
Singapore
Solomon Islands
Thailand
Vanuatu
Vietnam
Western Samoa

0.1
12.3
0.1
0
17.1
1.6
52.8
0
0
6.1
0
0
0

50
60
33.3
30.8
64.3
60
60
60
60
60
77.8
30.8
60

0.08
5-063
0
0
18.802
1.653
45.993
0.02
1.395
4.864
0
0
1.144

63.6
66.6
41.6
25
66.6
66.6
72.7
66.6
66.6
66.6
72.7
30
66.6

0.1
11.381
0
0
22.168
2.137
51.884
0
1.395
5.943
0.912
0
1.136

* Total aid in m illions of dollars (U.S.).
** Important votes adjusted for abstentions.
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53.8
66.7
62.5
27.3
75
53.8
53.8
61.5
69.2
61.5
69.2
27.3
69.2

APPENDIX 3

1996 Results
Ordered Alphabetically
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1995 Results

i
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